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pro vyhledávání: '"Klaas J. Beniers"'
Autor:
Otto H. Swank, Klaas J. Beniers
Publikováno v:
Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization. 20:353-378
This discussion paper led to a publication in the 'Journal of Law, Economics & Organization', 2004, 20, 353-378. This paper is concerned with the role of committees in collective decision-makingprocesses in a world where agents must be motivated to c
Autor:
Klaas J. Beniers
textabstractThis paper examines the incentives for a party leader in office and for a parties' rank-and-file to replace a sitting member of parliament. As to the leader's decision, we show that the leader prefers to replace a critical member of parli
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::22be53b37ea21e3a4ba6a20ff83ac316
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/05080.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/05080.pdf
Autor:
Klaas J. Beniers, Robert Dur
We study electoral competition among politicians who are heterogeneous both in competence and in how much they care about (what they perceive as) the public interest relative to the private rents from being in office. We show that politicians’
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::c8c470a3fba2f024b9c67f89a5160e64
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1228.pdf
http://www.cesifo-group.de/DocDL/cesifo1_wp1228.pdf
Autor:
Klaas J. Beniers, Robert A.J. Dur
Trade unions tend to reduce the dispersion of wages among their members. Skilled workers may therefore have an incentive to separate from an encompassing union and organize into a separate craft union. In this paper, we examine a theoretical model to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::02c29b2222499f90dbaa5d1eab50263f
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/03005.pdf
http://papers.tinbergen.nl/03005.pdf
Autor:
Robert Dur, Klaas J. Beniers
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
textabstractTrade unions tend to reduce the dispersion of wages among their members. Skilled workers may therefore have an incentive to separate from an encompassing union and organize into a separate craft union. In this paper, we examine a theoreti
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The collection of information necessary fordecision-making is often delegated to agents (e.g. bureaucrats,advisors, lawyers). If both the pros and cons of a decision haveto be examined, it is better to use competing agents instead of asingle agent. T