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pro vyhledávání: '"Kirill Rudov"'
We study the impacts of incomplete information on centralized one-to-one matching markets. We focus on the commonly used Deferred Acceptance mechanism (Gale and Shapley, 1962). We show that many complete-information results are fragile to a small inf
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::82854e9fb5c807aafd5817d464393c3b
https://doi.org/10.3386/w29043
https://doi.org/10.3386/w29043
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We study the effectiveness of iterated elimination of strictly-dominated actions in random games. We show that dominance solvability of games is vanishingly small as the number of at least one player's actions grows. Furthermore, conditional on domin