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pro vyhledávání: '"Khezr, Peyman"'
This study explores the performance of auctions in China's seasoned equity offering (SEO) market, both theoretically and empirically. In these auctions, issuers must commit to a pre-announced revenue target and a maximum number of shares available fo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2410.00063
Autor:
Khezr, Peyman
Secondary markets and resale are integral components of all emission trading systems. Despite the justification for these secondary trades, such as unpredictable demand, they may encourage speculation and result in the misallocation of permits. In th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.07386
Autor:
Khezr, Peyman, Taylor, Kendall
Understanding bidding behavior in multi-unit auctions remains an ongoing challenge for researchers. Despite their widespread use, theoretical insights into the bidding behavior, revenue ranking, and efficiency of commonly used multi-unit auctions are
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2404.15633
Autor:
Mohan, Vijay, Khezr, Peyman
In this paper, we take a close look at a problem labeled maximal extractable value (MEV), which arises in a blockchain due to the ability of a block producer to manipulate the order of transactions within a block. Indeed, blockchains such as Ethereum
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.19077
This paper examines knapsack auctions as a method to solve the knapsack problem with incomplete information, where object values are private and sizes are public. We analyze three auction types-uniform price (UP), discriminatory price (DP), and gener
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2403.07928
Publikováno v:
In Energy Economics January 2024 129
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Environmental Economics and Management March 2022 112
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