Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Kevin Siqueira"'
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Jingxian Chen
Publikováno v:
Defence and Peace Economics. 33:805-817
We allow for the possibility of revenge in attacker-defender conflicts under a variety of settings including, for example, when one of the players faces a no-win situation. In a two-player two-peri...
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Operational Research. 287:1180-1190
Existing literature has demonstrated that exacting revenge can have a self-deterrence effect and a value of revenge effect. The former means that each player will decrease effort when competing for a resource because of fear of a rival’s revenge wh
Autor:
Petros G. Sekeris, Kevin Siqueira
Publikováno v:
Review of Industrial Organization. 58:455-474
We demonstrate that more intense competition in games with production and negative externalities may be payoff-improving, and therefore welcomed by incumbents. In games that feature equilibria with strategic complements, increased competition may giv
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Daniel G. Arce
Publikováno v:
European Journal of Political Economy. 63:101878
This paper investigates an agency model of a terrorist organization in which the training and motivation of recruits can occur onsite, in physical training camps, or at arm’s length through the Internet. In so doing, we develop measures of the effe
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Daniel G. Arce
Publikováno v:
Journal of Theoretical Politics. 26:677-695
We investigate the problem of motivating terrorist operatives for suicide missions and conventional terrorist attacks when operatives have either self-interested or social preferences that are not observable by the terrorist organization. We characte
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Hong Chao
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 9:147-159
This paper illustrates the impact of mixed contracts on teamwork and welfare in a partnership when production depends on the efforts of agents in their own tasks as well as their efforts in helping other teammates. We show that a mixed contract that
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Hong Chao
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 34:417-427
We compare the impact of two different mixed contracts on agent efforts when production depends on agent efforts at their own tasks as well as at helping others. The first contract combines compensation based on team output with that of a tournament
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Petros G. Sekeris
Publikováno v:
Economics & Politics. 24:157-181
The article provides an analytical approach to capturing the population-centric view of insurgency and allows for the inclusion of politics in describing its earliest stages. The outcome of the politico-military contest over population support now be
Autor:
Kevin Siqueira, Todd Sandler
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 142:237-253
The paper presents a game-theoretic representation of a general terrorist organization (GTO) that delegates responsibility to local terrorist representatives in n countries. The GTO achieves a strategic advantage by deploying a more radical represent