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pro vyhledávání: '"Kevin Scharp"'
Autor:
Kevin Scharp
Kevin Scharp proposes an original theory of the nature and logic of truth on which truth is an inconsistent concept that should be replaced for certain theoretical purposes. Replacing Truth opens with an overview of work on the nature of truth (e.g.,
Autor:
Alison Duncan Kerr, Kevin Scharp
Artificial Intelligence (AI) pervades humanity in 2022, and it is notoriously difficult to understand how certain aspects of it work. There is a movement—Explainable Artificial Intelligence (XAI)—to develop new methods for explaining the behaviou
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::95d9b51179c4bb51901f35df9f820193
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26000
https://hdl.handle.net/10023/26000
Autor:
Kevin Scharp
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 198:647-688
What is the property of being true like? To answer this question, begin with a Canberra-plan analysis of the concept of truth. That is, assemble the platitudes for the concept of truth, and then investigate which property might satisfy them. This pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6a753671def000c2fbf5ac71c65e640d
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02491-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11229-019-02491-4
Autor:
Kevin Scharp
Publikováno v:
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics ISBN: 0198801858
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
University of St Andrews CRIS
Conceptual Engineering and Conceptual Ethics
University of St Andrews CRIS
From familiar concepts like tall and table to exotic ones like gravity and genocide, they guide our lives and are the basis for how we represent the world. However, there is good reason to think that many of our most cherished concepts, like truth, f
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1ee5aedb87e3408235edaf1cf46162dc
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0019
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198801856.003.0019
Autor:
Kevin Scharp
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 78:454-463
Paraconsistent dialetheism is the view that some contradictions are true and that the inference rule ex falso quod libet (a.k.a. explosion) is invalid. A long-standing problem for paraconsistent dialetheism is that it has difficulty making sense of s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::4b2e4aadc6c909f28c3fc7843ccc0427
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx163
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anx163
Autor:
Kevin Scharp
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. 62:422-475
Andrew Bacon, Matti Eklund, and Patrick Greenough have individually proposed objections to the project in my book, Replacing Truth. Briefly, the book outlines a conceptual engineering project – our defective concept of truth is replaced for certain
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::717848a6de6c9ceddeca13f26c1a5a49
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2017.1420012
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2017.1420012
Autor:
Bryan R. Weaver, Kevin Scharp
The focus of the book is the semantics of reasons locutions, for example reasons for someone to do something or believe something or be a certain way. Given the leading role that talk of reasons plays in many different kinds of philosophy, the book a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f907dc438f9ce4149d2477f8f24e15f6
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198832621.001.0001
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198832621.001.0001
Autor:
Bryan R. Weaver, Kevin Scharp
Chapter 2 presents the particular reasons locutions on which the book focuses, and argue that one of them is fundamental. The chapter identifies the logical form of this fundamental reasons locution by introducing the idea that ‘reason’ is a pred
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::248b8d0a9c5e45b1482e9182fab4756d
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198832621.003.0002
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780198832621.003.0002