Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 12
pro vyhledávání: '"Kevin Dorst"'
Autor:
Brian Hedden, Kevin Dorst
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 82:417-425
Higher-order evidence is evidence about what is rational to think in light of your evidence. Many have argued that it is special – falling into its own evidential category, or leading to deviations from standard rational norms. But it is not. Given
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6aa4694618b01d7af109270d9b34440e
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab081
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab081
Autor:
Kevin Dorst, Matthew Mandelkern
Publikováno v:
Philosophers' Imprint. 22
Recent work has argued that belief is weak: the level of rational credence required for belief is relatively low. That literature has contrasted belief with assertion, arguing that the latter requires an epistemic state much stronger than (weak) beli
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::12518057a20c4f939fa21baa0fddd080
https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1076
https://doi.org/10.3998/phimp.1076
Autor:
Kevin Dorst, Matthew Mandelkern
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 105:581-618
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1c6d38a5b108a88c9ce0c0850bc13a28
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12831
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12831
Autor:
Kevin Dorst
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 81:611-621
Many have claimed that whenever an investigation might provide evidence for a claim, it might also provide evidence against it. Similarly, many have claimed that your credence should never be on the edge of the range of credences that you think might
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fabf15a78026a877da30ad44db775aee
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab003
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anab003
Autor:
Kevin Dorst
Publikováno v:
The Philosophical Review. 129:484-489
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::96d0a0aa5d875987d42c16e2dc347ba0
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473
https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-8311473
There are many things—call them ‘experts’—that you should defer to in forming your opinions. The trouble is, many experts are modest: they’re less than certain that they are worthy of deference. When this happens, the standard theories of d
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3cc9f6c2ecd835d2eca2c9f39675ba2a
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b9883828-b536-4ed5-b043-fb1f66b5a10e
https://ora.ox.ac.uk/objects/uuid:b9883828-b536-4ed5-b043-fb1f66b5a10e
Autor:
Kevin Dorst
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8043f79625f5d724c2d98077ef22751f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918498
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3918498
Autor:
Kevin Dorst
Publikováno v:
Analysis. 82:473-473
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::501fc203a1086fdcce5b9b8417796863
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac024
https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anac024
Autor:
Kevin Dorst
The Lockean Thesis says that you must believe p iff you’re sufficiently confident of it. On some versions, the ‘must’ asserts a metaphysical connection; on others, it asserts a normative one. On some versions, ‘sufficiently confident’ refer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a9c876791152d15f705591d3da55c344
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx028
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzx028
Autor:
Kevin Dorst
KK is the thesis that if you can know p, you can know that you can know p. Though it’s unpopular, a flurry of considerations has recently emerged in its favour. Here we add fuel to the fire: standard resources allow us to show that any failure of K
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c462f127f9613958c698dc3e3280750c
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy067
https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzy067