Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 37
pro vyhledávání: '"Kerim Keskin"'
Autor:
Emin Karagözoğlu, Kerim Keskin
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 6, Iss 2, Pp 161-174 (2015)
We set up a rich bilateral bargaining model with four salient points (disagreement point, ideal point, reference point, and tempered aspirations point), where the disagreement point and the utility possibilities frontier are endogenously determined.
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e6395337ce3b496a92fadd605dcf9a66
Autor:
Zeynep Kantur, Kerim Keskin
Publikováno v:
Economics: Journal Articles (2017)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/8d31fc0195364e61bf75a704aa5a483e
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory
We construct a parametric family of (modified) divide-the-dollar games: when there is excess demand, some portion of the dollar may disappear and the remaining portion is distributed in a bankruptcy problem. In two extremes, this game family captures
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ed3eeca7186714ff3d590f498db7d671
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/111467
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/111467
Autor:
Zeynep Kantur, Kerim Keskin
Publikováno v:
Bulletin of Economic Research. 73:643-659
Although New Keynesian models with labor market frictions found an increase in unemployment and a decrease in labor market tightness in response to a positive technology shock (which appears to be in line with recent empirical findings), the volatili
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::415816d69dd018566967708a7f244be0
https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12269
https://doi.org/10.1111/boer.12269
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare
We propose a novel tournament design that incorporates some properties of a round-robin tournament, a Swiss tournament, and a race. The new design includes an all-play-all structure with endogenous scheduling and a winning threshold. Considering a st
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::0113b2d9835c459a0a1914b73a3af2bc
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/111468
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/111468
Autor:
Meltem Ucal, Kerim Keskin
Publikováno v:
Journal of Hospitality & Tourism Research. 45:304-324
This article contributes to the game-theoretic analysis of tourism supply chains. We start with a baseline model including three types of agents: (a) one theme park, (b) multiple accommodation providers, and (c) multiple tour operators. We investigat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e5b5c9d08e7107e490d945d21eca1215
https://doi.org/10.1177/1096348020913949
https://doi.org/10.1177/1096348020913949
Autor:
Kerim Keskin
Publikováno v:
Bargaining ISBN: 9783030766658
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::947ae459a52154a94950dcbff78230cb
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_5
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-76666-5_5
Publikováno v:
Journal of Conflict Resolution
We present a game-theoretic approach to the analysis of the emergence or survival of buffer states. We analyze a two-stage game with three players orderly located on a linear territory, where the player in the middle is passive, and the players on th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c83dd7aee621e5c19e690bd90a19e256
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/111251
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/111251
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision
Strong Nash equilibrium (see Aumann, 1959) and coalition-proof Nash equilibrium (see Bernheim et al., 1987) rely on the idea that players are allowed to form coalitions and make joint deviations. Both of these notions consider cases in which any coal
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::8b54d168575241f7c13277a05c3ef73e
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/77272
https://hdl.handle.net/11693/77272
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences
We study bribing in a sequential team contest with multiple pairwise battles. Allowing for asymmetries in winning prizes and marginal costs of effort, we present the conditions under which (i) a player in a team is offered a bribe by the owner of the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d7d557e32d11b0f199f404e9e45cd09d
https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/233538
https://aperta.ulakbim.gov.tr/record/233538