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pro vyhledávání: '"Kelly, Jerry"'
Autor:
Kelly, Jerry S.
Necessary and sufficient conditions are derived for a social choice correspondence to be the one that selects the Pareto optimal alternatives.
Comment: 18 pages
Comment: 18 pages
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.04047
Autor:
Kelly, Jerry S., Qi, Shaofang
A social choice correspondence satisfies balancedness if, for every pair of alternatives, x and y, and every pair of individuals, i and j, whenever a profile has x adjacent to but just above y for individual i while individual j has y adjacent to but
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1804.02990
Autor:
Kelly, Jerry S.
Determination of the range of a variety of social choice correspondences: Plurality voting, the Borda rule, the Pareto rule, the Copeland correspondence, approval voting, and the top cycle correspondence
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1712.09629
Autor:
Kelly, Jerry S., Qi, Shaofang
We present a class of orderings L for which there exists a profile u of preferences for a fixed odd number of individuals such that Borda's rule maps u to L.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1507.03520
Autor:
Campbell, Donald E., Kelly, Jerry S.
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other. Then we establish a result with a Gibbard-Satterthwaite flavor: g is dictatorial if its range contains at least three alternatives.
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1502.07933
Autor:
Campbell, Donald E., Kelly, Jerry S.
Let g be a strategy-proof rule on the domain NP of profiles where no alternative Pareto-dominates any other and let g have range S on NP. We complete the proof of a Gibbard-Satterthwaite result - if S contains more than two elements, then g is dictat
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1408.7044
Autor:
Kelly, Jerry S., Qi, Shaofang
Publikováno v:
In Mathematical Social Sciences November 2019 102:59-67
