Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 30
pro vyhledávání: '"Kazumura, Tomoya"'
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Theory July 2020 188
Autor:
Kazumura, Tomoya, Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 2016 Oct 01. 47(3), 633-663.
Externí odkaz:
http://www.jstor.org/stable/26153478
Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1097:1-38
We consider the problem of allocating multiple units of an indivisible object among agents and collecting payments. Each agent can receive multiple units of the object, and his (consumption) bundle is a pair of the units he receives and his payment.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::40f51a40e4c237754305393c31bc7b85
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77107
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/77107
Autor:
Tajika, Tomoya1 (AUTHOR) tomoyatajika@gmail.com, Kazumura, Tomoya2 (AUTHOR) pge003kt@gmail.com
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. Jun2019, Vol. 48 Issue 2, p543-569. 27p.
Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1001:1-55
May 2017. Revised January 2020
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers
A seller is selling multiple objects to a set of agents. Each agent can buy at most one object and his utility over consumption bundles (i.e., (object,transfer) pairs) need not be quasilinear. The seller considers
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::821f97249df266a8c68eda35b26fbbd6
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61274
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 1005:1-61
This paper studies a model of mechanism design with transfers where agents' preferences need not be quasilinear. In such a model, (1) we characterize dominant strategy incentive compatible mechanisms using a monotonicity property; (2) we establish a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::e76f79aa3f3bb7572c707e9f1a2ea77f
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61913
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/61913
Autor:
Kazumura, Tomoya
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::883f846cbeba5dd6faef01ab2712cbee
http://t2r2.star.titech.ac.jp/cgi-bin/publicationinfo.cgi?q_publication_content_number=CTT100806574
http://t2r2.star.titech.ac.jp/cgi-bin/publicationinfo.cgi?q_publication_content_number=CTT100806574
Autor:
Tajika, Tomoya, Kazumura, Tomoya
Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 972:1-31
We consider a problem of allocating multiple identical objects to a group of agents and collecting payments. Each agent may receive several objects and has quasi-linearpreferenceswithasubmodularvaluationfunction. ItisknownthatWalrasian mechanisms are
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::3114543c4bad9b25d99ee4b5dfa11d86
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56978
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/56978
Autor:
Kazumura, Tomoya, Serizawa, Shigehiro
Publikováno v:
Institute of Social and Economic Research Discussion Papers. 943:1-24
Consider the problem of allocating objects to agents and how much they should pay. Each agent has a preference relation over pairs of a set of objects and a payment. Preferences are not necessarily quasi-linear. Non-quasi-linear preferences describe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=jairo_______::285d2d3bca7f41471769f13e1f141af4
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/52390
https://hdl.handle.net/11094/52390