Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 38
pro vyhledávání: '"Katja Seim"'
Publikováno v:
AEA Papers and Proceedings. 113:229-233
We examine the demand-side implications of Amazon's distribution and logistics investments. Our results indicate that online demand–transactions at Amazon and its competitors–does not respond to the consumer's proximity to Amazon's upstream fulfi
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 91:147-190
We quantify the distortionary effects of nexus tax laws on Amazon's distribution network investments between 1999 and 2018. We highlight the role of two features of the expansion of Amazon's network: densification of the network of distribution facil
Autor:
Nathan Miller, Steven Berry, Fiona Scott Morton, Jonathan Baker, Timothy Bresnahan, Martin Gaynor, Richard Gilbert, George Hay, Ginger Jin, Bruce Kobayashi, Francine Lafontaine, James Levinsohn, Leslie Marx, John Mayo, Aviv Nevo, Ariel Pakes, Nancy Rose, Daniel Rubinfeld, Steven Salop, Marius Schwartz, Katja Seim, Carl Shapiro, Howard Shelanski, David Sibley, Andrew Sweeting, Marta Wosinska
Publikováno v:
Journal of Antitrust Enforcement. 10:248-259
The article explains why regressions of price on HHI should not be used in merger review. Both price and HHI are equilibrium outcomes determined by demand, supply, and the factors that drive them. Thus, a regression of price on the HHI does not recov
Autor:
Paul Heidhues, Alessandro Bonatti, L. Elisa Celis, Gregory S. Crawford, David Dinielli, Michael Luca, Tobias Salz, Monika Schnitzer, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Katja Seim, Michael Sinkinson, Jidong Zhou
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::90d93864f0fd543cac0c12a746b298df
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/215618/
https://www.zora.uzh.ch/id/eprint/215618/
Autor:
Katja Seim, Fiona Scott Morton, Jacques Crémer, David Dinielli, Amelia Fletcher, Paul Heidhues, Monika Schnitzer, Gregory S. Crawford
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
There is broad international consensus that ex ante regulation is needed to address the market dominance of the very largest digital platforms and that there are benefits to having broadly coherent regulatory approaches across jurisdictions. Regulati
Autor:
Katja Seim, David Dinielli, Jacques Crémer, Amelia Fletcher, Gregory S. Crawford, Paul Heidhues, Monika Schnitzer, Fiona Scott Morton
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper addresses interoperability a “super tool” to promote and preserve competition in digital platform markets where network effects are strong. As is widely acknowledged, these markets have an inherent tendency towards concentration, leavi
Autor:
Amelia Fletcher, Paul Heidhues, Fiona Scott Morton, Monika Schnitzer, David Dinielli, Katja Seim, Jacques Crémer, Gregory S. Crawford
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We analyze the use of the concepts of fairness and contestability in the Digital Markets Act (DMA) and propose formal definitions rooted in the economic analysis of digital markets as well as the goals of the proposed law. We discuss the implication
Autor:
Nathan Miller, Steven T. Berry, Fiona M. Scott Morton, Jonathan B. Baker, Timothy F. Bresnahan, Martin Gaynor, Richard Gilbert, George Alan Hay, Ginger Zhe Jin, Bruce H. Kobayashi, Francine Lafontaine, James A. Levinsohn, Leslie M. Marx, John W. Mayo, Aviv Nevo, Ariel Pakes, Nancy L. Rose, Daniel L. Rubinfeld, Steven C. Salop, Marius Schwartz, Katja Seim, Carl Shapiro, Howard A. Shelanski, David S. Sibley, Andrew Sweeting
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Commodity taxation often involves uniform tax rates. We use alcohol laws that tax differentiated spirits with a comprehensive uniform markup to evaluate redistribution generated by such simple tax policy. We document preference heterogeneity among co
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3323d6dde89c12e99999720235ad075b
https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/69545/
https://ueaeprints.uea.ac.uk/id/eprint/69545/
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 66:980-1016
Merger simulations focus on the price changes that result once previously independent competitors set prices jointly and other market participants respond. We consider the incentives for firms to adjust the set of offered products after a merger. Usi