Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 10
pro vyhledávání: '"Kane Sweeney"'
Publikováno v:
Marketing Science. 40:619-636
We analyze a large-scale field experiment on StubHub.com and show that disclosing fees upfront reduces both the quantity and quality of purchases.
Publikováno v:
Marketing Science. 40:593-618
This paper provides a set of tools to compute and implement optimal reserve prices for online auctions.
Publikováno v:
Quantitative Economics. 8:181-200
We present a partial identification approach for ascending auctions with bidder asymmetries, where bidders' asymmetric types may be unobservable to the econometrician. Our approach yields sharp bounds and builds on and generalizes other recent bounds
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We present a model for competition between ride-hailing platforms. Riders choose a platform to maximize their utility which is decreasing in price and waiting time. Drivers can accept ride requests from both platforms. Platforms compete via prices ov
We study reserve prices computed to maximize the expected profit of the seller based on historical observations of incomplete bid data typically available to the auction designer in online auctions for advertising or e-commerce. This direct approach
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a53c0f3340da02b730d915ab790cfa4f
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24698
https://doi.org/10.3386/w24698
Autor:
Kane Sweeney, Renato Gomes
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 86:421-437
We develop a Bayes–Nash analysis of the generalized second-price (GSP) auction, the multi-unit auction used by search engines to sell sponsored advertising positions. Our main result characterizes the efficient Bayes–Nash equilibrium of the GSP a
We introduce a simple and robust approach to answering two key questions in empirical auction analysis: discriminating between models of entry and quantifying the revenue gains from improving auction design. The approach builds on Bulow and Klemperer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2f17679c01e6531926acd9793139d148
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20523.pdf
http://www.nber.org/papers/w20523.pdf
Autor:
Renato Gomes, Kane Sweeney
Publikováno v:
EC
In this paper we develop a Bayes-Nash analysis of the Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction, the mechanism used by search engines to sell sponsored advertising positions. Interestingly, our results are in sharp contrast with the previous literature