Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 69
pro vyhledávání: '"Kamwa, Eric"'
Autor:
Kamwa, Eric1 (AUTHOR) eric.kamwa@univ-antilles.fr
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. Jul2023, Vol. 196 Issue 1/2, p169-205. 37p. 7 Charts.
Autor:
Kamwa, Eric, Merlin, Vincent
Publikováno v:
Social Choice and Welfare, 2018 Jan 01. 50(1), 171-189.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/45094509
Autor:
Kamwa, Eric1 eric.kamwa@univ-antilles.fr
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. Jul2022, Vol. 192 Issue 1/2, p79-97. 19p. 5 Charts, 3 Graphs.
Autor:
Kamwa, Eric, Valognes, Fabrice
Publikováno v:
Revue d'économie politique, 2017 May 01. 127(3), 375-396.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26596164
Autor:
Mansour, Mohamed, Kamwa, Eric
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Finance and Public Choice; 20240101, Issue: Preprints p1-17, 17p
Autor:
Kamwa, Eric, Merlin, Vincent
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Mathematical Economics December 2015 61:130-138
A candidate is said to be socially acceptable if the number of voters who rank her among the most preferred half of the candidates is at least as large as the number of voters who rank her among the least preferred half (Mahajne and Volij, 2018). For
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______166::a2f25506d17108b6bf067168ca6b6f0b
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03614587
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03614587
In three-candidate elections with single-peaked preferences, this paper analyzes the vulnerability of scoring runoff rules to abstention and participation paradoxes. These paradoxes occur when the size of the electorate varies (grows or diminishes).
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::2d484f2cccbc6b641f16c1915b3613e8
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03143741/document
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03143741/document