Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Justin Dijk"'
Autor:
Heleen L. P. Mees, Justin Dijk, Daan van Soest, Peter P. J. Driessen, Marleen H. F. M. W. van Rijswick, Hens Runhaar
Publikováno v:
Ecology and Society, Vol 19, Iss 2, p 58 (2014)
Policy instruments can help put climate adaptation plans into action. Here, we propose a method for the systematic assessment and selection of policy instruments for stimulating adaptation action. The multi-disciplinary set of six assessment criteria
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/470aa9c2e02d4c079b0ec291cc66c947
Publikováno v:
European Review of Agricultural Economics, 47(3), 1250-1275. Oxford University Press
Bouma, J A, Nguyen, T T B, Van Der Heijden, E & Dijk, J J 2020, ' Analysing group contract design using a threshold public goods experiment ', European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1250-1275 . https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbz045
Bouma, J A, Nguyen, T T B, Van Der Heijden, E & Dijk, J J 2020, ' Analysing group contract design using a threshold public goods experiment ', European Review of Agricultural Economics, vol. 47, no. 3, pp. 1250-1275 . https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbz045
This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ed6918ac732589ab1c5193228f54d29a
https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbz045
https://doi.org/10.1093/erae/jbz045
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0a907b47474cc56374e4248a875d6e36
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287932
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3287932
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper presents the results of a threshold public goods game experiment with heterogeneous players. The experiment is designed in close collaboration with the Dutch association of agri-environmental farmer collectives. Subjects are recruited at a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::37abfe3df17cb51a767ef8989bf93e2e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289072
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3289072
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We present a general model of bidding behavior in wildlife corridor auctions. Given (i) some spatial configuration of landowners in a landscape, (ii) the landowners’ opportunity costs, and (iii) the value of establishing the corridor, our model pre
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::caf11e78097377ec3130f0634955c53b
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2946850
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2946850
Autor:
Justin Dijk, Bert Willems
Publikováno v:
Dijk, J J & Willems, B 2011, ' The effect of counter-trading on competition in electricity markets ', Energy Policy, vol. 39, no. 3, pp. 1764-1773 . https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.01.008
Energy Policy, 39(3), 1764-1773. Elsevier BV
Energy Policy, 39(3), 1764-1773. ELSEVIER SCI LTD
Energy Policy, 39(3), 1764-1773. Elsevier BV
Energy Policy, 39(3), 1764-1773. ELSEVIER SCI LTD
In a competitive electricity market, nodal pricing is the most efficient way to manage congestion. Counter-trading is inefficient as it gives the wrong long term signals for entry and exit of power plants. However, in a non-competitive market, additi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::df822cca939c5fa06e00f24c77e47ae2
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/ac689646-0c39-410f-b5cd-fd748a1019a6
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/ac689646-0c39-410f-b5cd-fd748a1019a6
Publikováno v:
Tilburg University-PURE
Economisch Statistische Berichten, 104(4771), 110-113
Economisch Statistische Berichten, 104(4771), 110-113
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::512d6bb0cabb1a3f0469f4dde33ed7f1
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/c8316150-f647-466c-aceb-5fdf93e3b2ef
https://research.tilburguniversity.edu/en/publications/c8316150-f647-466c-aceb-5fdf93e3b2ef
Publikováno v:
Vrije Universiteit Amsterdam
Dijk, J, Ansink, E & van Soest, D 2018 ' Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect ' TI Discussion Paper Series, no. 18-093/VIII, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam . < http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpaper/?paper=2959 >
Dijk, J, Ansink, E & van Soest, D 2018 ' Conservation auctions, collusion and the endowment effect ' TI Discussion Paper Series, no. 18-093/VIII, Tinbergen Institute, Amsterdam . < http://www.tinbergen.nl/discussionpaper/?paper=2959 >
We contribute to the literature on the optimal design of auction mechanisms for the procurement of nature conservation activities. We use an economic experiment to examine whether the market efficiency of conservation auctions increases or decreases
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::eb07c554c87ec97818e6f346cd8eebab
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/4d896744-18d2-4f4e-9463-a7bc75a3534b
https://research.vu.nl/en/publications/4d896744-18d2-4f4e-9463-a7bc75a3534b