Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 65
pro vyhledávání: '"Junichiro Ishida"'
Autor:
Jun SAEGUSA, Akihiro TAGAWA, Hiroshi KURIKAMI, Kazuki IIJIMA, Hideki YOSHIKAWA, Takayuki TOKIZAWA, Shinichi NAKAYAMA, Junichiro ISHIDA
Publikováno v:
Mechanical Engineering Journal, Vol 3, Iss 3, Pp 15-00609-15-00609 (2016)
Approximately two months after the Fukushima nuclear accident, the Japan Atomic Energy Agency (JAEA) led off a series of demonstration tests to develop effective but easily applicable decontamination methods for various school facilities in Fukushima
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/dc479358928a4abfa266cd177893f842
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 90(3):1225-1260
This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double‐crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where the indifference curves of two types cross twice, such that the celebrated single‐cross
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::693e4c7e2e181a30aa6eb4f74f5bd0dc
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/277428
http://hdl.handle.net/2433/277428
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::2026b6d66faa3d246aadf765de253e30
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4381912
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4381912
Autor:
Chia-Hui Chen, Junichiro Ishida
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 69:239-269
A standard incomplete-information war of attrition is extended to incorporate experimentation and private learning. We obtain a characterization of all equilibria in this extended setup and use this setup to illuminate a tradeoff between short-run an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2535c8b2e28331a31f9f054f2513460f
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12250
https://doi.org/10.1111/joie.12250
Publikováno v:
Journal of the European Economic Association. 19:1981-2021
High-ability agents are more likely to achieve early success in risky experimentation, but learn faster that their project is not promising. These counteracting effects give rise to a signaling model with double-crossing property. This property tends
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c19df18b5e8939fe08346ae5966dd725
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa046
https://doi.org/10.1093/jeea/jvaa046
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::19790eccfa005cbb8f8ac5ebdd5813c7
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4051180
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.4051180
Publikováno v:
European Economic Review. 152:104360
Timing of market entry is one of the most important strategic decisions a firm must make, but its decision process becomes convoluted with information and payoff spillovers. The threat of competition pushes firms to enter earlier to preempt their riv
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::deac634206a1eacf6d5fa65654030cb2
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104360
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2022.104360
Autor:
Kazuya Terabe, Junichiro Ishida, Kinya Kawamura, Takashi Tsuchiya, Masaki Sekine, Takeshi Fujita
Publikováno v:
Transactions of the Materials Research Society of Japan. 44:197-201
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ed9d85f80dbc747f29673541caa809e7
https://doi.org/10.14723/tmrsj.44.197
https://doi.org/10.14723/tmrsj.44.197
Autor:
Junichiro Ishida, Takashi Shimizu
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 68(2):303-334
In this paper we analyze a cheap-talk model with a partially informed receiver. In clear contrast to the previous literature, we find that there is a case where the receiver’s prior knowledge enhances the amount of information conveyed via cheap ta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cd5e216c9a635dba94f8ebcc0a2a37d8
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14094/90006379
https://hdl.handle.net/20.500.14094/90006379
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper provides a general analysis of signaling under double-crossing preferences with a continuum of types. There are natural economic environments where indifference curves of two types cross twice, so that the celebrated single-crossing proper
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0700c198a0f63d3e4c74c2a297b0e79f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3706622
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3706622