Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 79
pro vyhledávání: '"Jun Koga"'
Publikováno v:
IEEE Access, Vol 10, Pp 114869-114884 (2022)
XLoader and FakeSpy, the two major smishing botnets targeting Japan, change their attack strategies over various timescales. Based on recent observations of the botnets and Twitter data, we present empirical facts about their strategies and activity
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/5a08e18029d44c8b8cb3516e5ace18dc
Publikováno v:
Research & Politics, Vol 3 (2016)
Literature on coup-proofing often suggests that such activities reduce military effectiveness, which could provide an environment ripe for civil conflict. However, if coup-proofing is dangerous, why do leaders engage in these strategies? We argue tha
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9d7718fd7ef54e52b9745fb3bdf2532c
Autor:
Sudduth, Jun Koga1, Gallop, Max1
Publikováno v:
Journal of Politics. Jul2023, Vol. 85 Issue 3, p933-948. 16p.
Autor:
Sudduth, Jun Koga, Bell, Curtis
Publikováno v:
International Studies Quarterly, 2018 Mar 01. 62(1), 145-159.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/48539081
Publikováno v:
Journal of Chemical Education. 100:869-874
Autor:
Bell, Curtis, Sudduth, Jun Koga
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Conflict Resolution, 2017 Aug 01. 61(7), 1432-1455.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/26363935
Autor:
Sudduth, Jun Koga
Publikováno v:
Journal of Peace Research, 2017 Jan 01. 54(1), 3-15.
Externí odkaz:
https://www.jstor.org/stable/44511192
Autor:
Jun Koga Sudduth, Nam Kyu Kim
Publikováno v:
Comparative Political Studies. 54:1597-1628
Does the creation of nominally democratic institutions help dictators stay in power by diminishing the risk of coups? We posit that the effectiveness of political institutions in deterring coups crucially depends on the types of plotters and their po
Autor:
Jun Koga Sudduth, Max Gallop
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics. :000-000
Autor:
Jun Koga Sudduth
Publikováno v:
Journal of Peace Research. 58:870-880
The principal threat most autocratic leaders face stems from within the regime. To control militaries and mitigate the risk of coups d’état, many autocratic leaders repeatedly purge strong officers from the military. What are the causes and conseq