Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 23
pro vyhledávání: '"Julián Costa"'
Autor:
Isabel Méndez Fernandez, Ignacio García Jurado, Silvia Lorenzo Freire, Luisa Carpente Rodríguez, Julián Costa Bouzas
Publikováno v:
Proceedings, Vol 2, Iss 18, p 1186 (2018)
This work focuses on the study of a task planning problem in a home care business. The objective is to schedule the working days of the available nurses, in order to assist all the active clients. Due to the large size of the real cases that must be
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/86e148f4a38b453e963bef9734e5f0a0
Publikováno v:
Annals of Operations Research. 318:935-961
In this paper we introduce the $$\Gamma $$ value, a new value for cooperative games with transferable utility. We also provide an axiomatic characterization of the $$\Gamma $$ value based on a property concerning the so-called necessary players. A ne
Publikováno v:
Trends in Mathematical, Information and Data Sciences ISBN: 9783031041365
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::aa5b5a283b556bd9588b5d5476647907
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04137-2_2
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-04137-2_2
Publikováno v:
TOP. 28:672-688
In this paper, we extend the equal division and the equal surplus division values for transferable utility cooperative games to the more general setup of transferable utility cooperative games with a priori unions. In the case of the equal surplus di
Publikováno v:
4OR. 18:457-476
An important problem in project management is determining ways to distribute amongst activities the costs that are incurred when a project is delayed because some activities end later than expected. In this study, we address this problem in stochasti
Null, Nullifying, and Necessary Agents: Parallel Characterizations of the Banzhaf and Shapley Values
Publikováno v:
Journal of Optimization Theory and Applications. 180:1027-1035
In a cooperative game, we consider three special kinds of agents: null, nullifying, and necessary agents. A coalition with a null agent receives the same payoff if this agent leaves the coalition, a coalition with a nullifying agent receives nothing,
Publikováno v:
Handbook of the Shapley Value ISBN: 9781351241410
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d5a00d485a70954daf704d15e2e3f317
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351241410-5
https://doi.org/10.1201/9781351241410-5
Autor:
Silvia Lorenzo-Freire, Isabel Méndez-Fernández, Julián Costa, Ignacio García-Jurado, Luisa Carpente
Publikováno v:
Health care management science. 23(4)
In this paper, we study a task scheduling problem in a home care business. The company has a set of supervisors in charge of scheduling the caregivers’ weekly plans. This can be a time-consuming task due to the large number of services they work wi
Publikováno v:
The R Journal. 12:419
Autor:
Julián Costa
Publikováno v:
Optimization. 65:797-809
The class of maintenance cost games was introduced in 2000 to deal with a cost allocation problem arising in the reorganization of the railway system in Europe. The main application of maintenance cost games regards the allocation of the maintenance