Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 33
pro vyhledávání: '"Juarez, Noelia"'
This paper presents weakened notions of corewise stability and setwise stability for matching markets where agents have substitutable choice functions. We introduce the concepts of worker-quasi-core, firm-quasi-core, and worker-quasisetwise stability
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2411.12533
We compute the lattice operations for the (pairwise) stable set in two-sided matching markets where only substitutability on agents' choice functions is imposed. To do this, we use Tarski operators defined on the lattices of worker-quasi-stable and f
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.21198
We study a one-to-one labor matching market. If a worker considers resigning from her current job to obtain a better one, how long does it take for this worker to actually get it? We present an algorithm that models this situation as a re-stabilizati
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.07084
In a many-to-one matching market, we analyze the matching game induced by a stable rule when firms' choice function satisfy substitutability. We show that any stable rule implements the individually rational correspondence in Nash equilibrium when bo
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.13956
We study envy-free allocations in a many-to-many matching model with contracts in which agents on one side of the market (doctors) are endowed with substitutable choice functions and agents on the other side of the market (hospitals) are endowed with
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2206.10758
In a many-to-one matchingmodel with responsive preferences in which indifferences are allowed, we study three notions of core, three notions of stability, and their relationships. We show that (i) the core contains the stable set, (ii) the strong cor
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2203.16293
In a many-to-many matching model in which agents' preferences satisfy substitutability and the law of aggregate demand, we present an algorithm to compute the full set of stable matchings. This algorithm relies on the idea of "cycles in preferences"
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2110.11846
In a many-to-one matching model in which firms' preferences satisfy substitutability, we study the set of worker-quasi-stable matchings. Worker-quasi-stability is a relaxation of stability that allows blocking pairs involving a firm and an unemployed
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2103.16330
Autor:
Bonifacio, Agustín G.1,2 (AUTHOR) abonifacio@unsl.edu.ar, Juarez, Noelia1,2 (AUTHOR), Neme, Pablo1,2 (AUTHOR), Oviedo, Jorge1,2 (AUTHOR)
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. Mar2024, Vol. 53 Issue 1, p143-157. 15p.
For a many-to-many matching market, we study the lattice structure of the set of random stable matchings. We define a partial order on the random stable set and present two intuitive binary operations to compute the least upper bound and the greatest
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2002.08156