Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 35
pro vyhledávání: '"Josse Delfgaauw"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science, 68(1), 230-256. INFORMS Institute for Operations Research and the Management Sciences
We conducted a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain of 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance increases with
Publikováno v:
The Leadership Quarterly, 31(3):101241. Elsevier Inc.
The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouriti
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We conduct a field experiment in a Dutch retail chain with 122 stores to study the interaction between team incentives, team social cohesion, and team performance. Theory predicts that the effect of team incentives on team performance depends on a te
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In the context of firm decision-making, several motives for acquiring and conveying information exist. Information serves to make better decisions, to persuade, and to impress. In this paper, we study how these motives shape incentives to acquire and
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We conducted a field experiment to examine the effects of student feedback to teachers at a large Dutch school for intermediate vocational education. Students evaluated all teachers, but only a randomly selected group of teachers received feedback. A
Autor:
Josse Delfgaauw, Otto H. Swank
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics & Management Strategy. 25:608-626
Employees' incentive to invest in their task proficiency depends on the likelihood that they will execute the same tasks in the future. Changes in tasks can be warranted as a result of technological progress and changes in firm strategy as well as fr
Publikováno v:
Journal of Labor Economics, 33(3), 521-569. University of Chicago Press
Journal of Labor Economics, 33(3), 521-569. University of Chicago
Journal of Labor Economics, 33(3), 521-569. University of Chicago
This discussion paper led to a publication in the Journal of Labor Economics . We conduct a field experiment in a large retail chain to test basic predictions of tournament theory regarding prize spread and noise. A random subset of the 208 stores pa
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The performance of a work team commonly depends on the effort exerted by the team members as well as on the division of tasks among them. However, when leaders assign tasks to team members, performance is usually not the only consideration. Favouriti
Autor:
Josse Delfgaauw, Robert Dur
Publikováno v:
Oxford Economic Papers, 61(3), 586-602. Oxford University Press
This paper examines the consequences of creating a fully competitive market in a sector previously dominated by a cost-minimising public firm. Workers in the economy are heterogeneous in their motivation to work in the sector. In line with empirical