Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 52
pro vyhledávání: '"Josepa Miquel-Florensa"'
Publikováno v:
Economics of Transition and Institutional Change
Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, 2021, 29 (1), pp.3-34. ⟨10.1111/ecot.12263⟩
Economics of Transition and Institutional Change, 2021, 29 (1), pp.3-34. ⟨10.1111/ecot.12263⟩
National audience; Are religious believers more prosocial than other people? In a trust game field experiment with 774 subjects in Haiti, we elicit willingness to pay to play in the presence of religious images, and argue that this can be interpreted
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Transportation infrastructure is associated with economic development, but it can also be used for social control and to benefit the governing elite. We explore the connection between the construction of road networks, state-led repression, and land
Publikováno v:
World Development
World Development, Elsevier, 2021, 144, ⟨10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105441⟩
World Development, Elsevier, 2021, 144, ⟨10.1016/j.worlddev.2021.105441⟩
National audience; We conducted an experimental study in Haiti testing for the relationship between religious belief and individual risk taking behavior. 774 subjects played lotteries in a standard neutral protocol and subsequently with reduced endow
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ff316ec3893f2dd559b1bc1303e0e573
https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/42419/
https://publications.ut-capitole.fr/id/eprint/42419/
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization, Elsevier, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 2020, 179, pp.223-239. ⟨10.1016/j.jebo.2020.08.046⟩
International audience; This paper challenges the conventional wisdom that giving voters more power - both formally through the use of more "open" electoral systems and informally through easier access to information on politicians' wrongdoings - wil
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::229c5406d6d329a90e9d1e9c9270f968
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03099759
https://hal.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03099759
Publikováno v:
The Review of International Organizations. 14:453-477
We present a model with two donors-principals that provide funds to a unique recipient-agent. Each donor decides how to allocate his aid funds between a pooled and a donor specific unilateral project. The production function of development depends po
Autor:
Josepa Miquel-Florensa
Publikováno v:
Theory and Decision. 74:151-166
We design a project funding contract that provides optimal incentives to agents, in a setting where both principal and agent enjoy the benefits of the project in a non-rival form once completed but may differ in their valuation. To do so, we study op
Autor:
Josepa Miquel-Florensa
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 99:1-28
We study the project allocation mechanisms trade-off between minimizing the waste of resources in the application process and maximizing the match of needs and projects when the recipient’s needs and resources are private information. We propose a
We analyze how Costa Rican coffee farmer's behavior in an experimental public good game depends on the institutional structure of the farmers buying point (cooperativevs.privately owned mills), and on the background of their game partners (partners s
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a3abdda0c3e1cd8b5134d761fbcf2d6e
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2015/cr_astrid_pepita_update.pdf
http://www.tse-fr.eu/sites/default/files/TSE/documents/doc/wp/2015/cr_astrid_pepita_update.pdf
Autor:
Josepa Miquel-Florensa
This paper models incentives and information asymmetries between the different participants in multilateral development banks' decision process, namely borrowing countries, managers and the board of governors (with borrower and non-borrower members).
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=od_______645::6d4cf9d7a8239269cd81a22042bd1de9
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/WSDocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35567264
http://idbdocs.iadb.org/WSDocs/getdocument.aspx?docnum=35567264
Autor:
Tapsoba, Augustin
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Development Economics January 2023 160