Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 50
pro vyhledávání: '"Jos A. M. Potters"'
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 39:89-104
This paper introduces yet another algorithm to compute the nucleolus of a standard tree game. One advantage of this algorithm is that it provides a very intuitive interpretation of the nucleolus, under which the players participate in a joint enterpr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2c1901686fe97ff882f34fa9051d25f1
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0176-3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00182-009-0176-3
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review, 9(2), 199-214. World Scientific Publishing Co. Pte Ltd
The paper investigates under which additional assumptions the bargaining set, the reactive bargaining set or the semireactive bargaining set coincides with the core on the class of symmetric TU-games. Furthermore, we give an example which illustrates
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2cbd179d28b7f0f451b1c455d6ce4533
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001369
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198907001369
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. :395-416
This paper investigates a class of dynamic selection processes for n-person normal-form games which includes the Brown-von Neumann-Nash dynamics. For (two-person) zero-sum games and for (n-person) potential games every limit set of these dynamics is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::aa20029dd2007689bdb444051431637c
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000989
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198906000989
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 54:205-225
This paper gives an algorithm for the nucleolus of simple flow games with directed and undirected, private as well as public arcs, under the condition that the flow game has a nonempty core.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a4de6e7e7440c74884ef73183eba6bbb
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.008
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2004.08.008
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 371-377
International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 3, pp. 371-377
International Journal of Game Theory, 32, 3, pp. 371-377
Hillas (1990) introduced a definition of strategic stability based on perturbations of the best reply correspondence that satisfies all of the requirements given by Kohlberg and Mertens (1986). Hillas et al. (2001) point out though that the proofs of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::88c3df7435c5e29bf9f9217056872764
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400168
https://doi.org/10.1007/s001820400168
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 44:223-233
This paper investigates the existence of envy-free and Pareto efficient allocations in economies with finitely many indivisible goods and one divisible good (money). The existence of envy-free allocations is proved under very weak conditions, but the
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ba70b9831a126192689cbbfd0ce4c292
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00064-1
https://doi.org/10.1016/s0165-4896(02)00064-1
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 28:1-12
In this paper we will answer the question if every exact game has a large core. For games with five or more players, the answer will be negative. For TU games with three or four players, every exact game has a large core. For totally balanced symmetr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::522c64e2762b1cff8f87d3dbb39fc523
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0686
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1998.0686
Autor:
Hans Reijnierse, Jos A. M. Potters
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior, 24, 77-96
Games and Economic Behavior, 24, pp. 77-96
Games and Economic Behavior, 24, pp. 77-96
In this paper we show that already relatively small collections of coalitions determine the nucleolus of a TU-game. We also show that for certain classes of combinatorial games a rather small collection of coalitions that determine the nucleolus can
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::fd3d8af8c7ba5e06db0ced3c2b3b95e6
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0629
https://doi.org/10.1006/game.1997.0629
Autor:
J. H. Reijnierse, Jos A. M. Potters
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Programming, 83, pp. 291-311
Mathematical Programming, 83, 291-311
Mathematical Programming, 83, 291-311
This paper describes an algorithm to find an (α-)envy-free Pareto-optimal division in the case of a finite number of homogeneous infinitely divisible goods and linear utility functions. It is used to find an allocation in the classical cake division
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::39658e8e83bd2318e04d533675c625eb
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02680564
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf02680564
Autor:
Henk Norde, Jos A. M. Potters
Publikováno v:
Mathematics of Operations Research. 22:631-638
In this paper a positive answer is given to the question of whether every semi-infinite bimatrix game is weakly determined.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9a6e9399864aca4c138c22cb07fa0b9f
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.3.631
https://doi.org/10.1287/moor.22.3.631