Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 13
pro vyhledávání: '"Jorgen W. Weibull"'
Autor:
Atahan Afsar, Jorgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Ingela Alger, Jorgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Eric Van Damme, Jorgen W Weibull
Bergin and Lipman (1996) show that the refinement effect from the random mutations in the adaptive dynamics in Kandori, Mailath and Rob (1993) and Young (1993) is due to restrictions on how these mutation rates vary across population states. We here
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=dedup_wf_001::561571ee4034c9389d0191fcdc2baa11
http://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0501.pdf.zip
http://swopec.hhs.se/iuiwop/papers/iuiwop0501.pdf.zip
Autor:
Andreas Ortmann, Jorgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
Southern Economic Journal. 63:834
Publikováno v:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 98:461
Publikováno v:
The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 97:15
During the past 15 years or so a "game theoretic revolution of economics" has taken place. Microeconomic theory has been rewritten in the language of a game theory; see Kreps (1 990b).I Publications in industrial organization differ substantially fro
Autor:
Jörgen W. Weibull, Mark Voorneveld
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 163-186 (2011)
We consider a market for lemons in which the seller is a monopolistic price setter and the buyer receives a private noisy signal of the product’s quality. We model this as a game and analyze perfect Bayesian equilibrium prices, trading probabilitie
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/eb2eb6e881654cb2aa84177519c7dc81
Autor:
Ingela Alger, Jörgen W. Weibull
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 8, Iss 3, p 38 (2017)
Does altruism and morality lead to socially better outcomes in strategic interactions than selfishness? We shed some light on this complex and non-trivial issue by examining a few canonical strategic interactions played by egoists, altruists and mora
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1044679db0834cfea2d37892b98acc26
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 7, Iss 4, p 37 (2016)
We define a concept of epistemic robustness in the context of an epistemic model of a finite normal-form game where a player type corresponds to a belief over the profiles of opponent strategies and types. A Cartesian product X of pure-strategy subse
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4c12ee28e3644bb68fb2c69fe5edcc9f