Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 34
pro vyhledávání: '"Jordan I. Siegel"'
Publikováno v:
Strategy Science. 6:111-118
Publikováno v:
Strategic Management Journal. 41:2072-2091
Autor:
Yujin Jeong, Jordan I. Siegel
Publikováno v:
Journal of International Business Studies. 51:1142-1160
Beginning with Rugman and Verbeke (J Int Bus Stud 35(1):3–18, 2004), several international business (IB) scholars have proposed that most large multinationals are not global but regional. This argument has recently been challenged for both its conc
Autor:
Jin Hyung Kim, Jordan I. Siegel
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Sarah Wolfolds, Jordan I. Siegel
Publikováno v:
Strategic Management Journal. 40:432-462
Research Summary Strategy research addresses endogeneity by incorporating econometric techniques, including Heckman's two‐step method. The economics literature theorizes regarding optimal usage of Heckman's method, emphasizing the valid exclusion c
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Operating within bounded rationality, individuals and organizations seek to maximize their utility or economic benefit, which many times leads to regulatory non-compliance. Although prior literature in economics and criminology agrees that three cond
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 129:329-356
We use a US Supreme Court case, Morrison v. National Australia Bank (2010), as a natural experiment to test the legal bonding hypothesis. By decreasing the potential liability of US-listed foreign firms, particularly due to class action lawsuits, Mor
Publikováno v:
Administrative Science Quarterly. 64:370-397
We theorize that foreign multinationals wield a particularly significant competitive weapon in host markets: as outsiders, they can pinpoint social schisms in host labor markets and exploit them for competitive advantage. Using two data sets from Sou
Autor:
Yujin Jeong, Jordan I. Siegel
Publikováno v:
Strategic Management Journal. 39:1083-1111
Research Summary: Social status and its dynamics may be an important predictor of which firms will engage in large‐scale bribery. Prior theory is incomplete, however, and prior studies have lacked comprehensive and reliable data on firm‐level bri