Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 89
pro vyhledávání: '"Joosten, Reinoud"'
Proefschrift Universiteit Maastricht.
Met index, lit. opg. - Met samenvatting in het Nederlands.
Met index, lit. opg. - Met samenvatting in het Nederlands.
Externí odkaz:
http://arno.unimaas.nl/show.cgi?fid=6709
Publikováno v:
2017, Volume 8, Number 4, Journal of Wireless Mobile Networks, Ubiquitous Computing, and Dependable Applications (JoWUA)
The attack intensity of distributed denial of service (DDoS) attacks is increasing every year. Botnets based on internet of things (IOT) devices are now being used to conduct DDoS attacks. The estimation of direct and indirect economic damages caused
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1806.01781
Publikováno v:
2017 25th Euromicro International Conference on Parallel, Distributed and Network-based Processing (PDP), St. Petersburg, 2017, pp. 354-362
DDoS attacks are increasingly used by `hackers' and `hacktivists' for various purposes. A number of on-line tools are available to launch an attack of significant intensity. These attacks lead to a variety of losses at the victim's end. We analyse th
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/1805.00749
Publikováno v:
Asia Pacific Journal of Marketing and Logistics, 2019, Vol. 32, Issue 5, pp. 1149-1170.
Externí odkaz:
http://www.emeraldinsight.com/doi/10.1108/APJML-04-2019-0240
Autor:
Li, Xianghui1 (AUTHOR) xianghuili_1107@163.com, Joosten, Reinoud2 (AUTHOR) r.a.m.g.joosten@utwente.nl, Uetz, Marc3 (AUTHOR) m.uetz@utwente.nl, Li, Yang1,4 (AUTHOR) xdjgyjrx@163.com
Publikováno v:
International Transactions in Operational Research. Nov2022, Vol. 29 Issue 6, p3346-3369. 24p. 4 Diagrams.
Autor:
Joosten, Reinoud1 (AUTHOR) r.a.m.g.joosten@utwente.nl, Harmelink, Rogier2 (AUTHOR) r.l.a.harmelink@utwente.nl
Publikováno v:
International Game Theory Review. Sep2023, Vol. 25 Issue 3, p1-34. 34p.
An evolutionary equilibrium is DSC-stable if it is (a) Dynamically stable, i.e., if the system at equilibrium is slightly disturbed, it returns to it, (b) Structurally stable, i.e., preserves defining properties for small perturbations of the underly
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::9607369736b2b5ecc7f91f13f94f7506
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/7c63c647-18c9-4008-b34b-0a6954a2f1c3
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/7c63c647-18c9-4008-b34b-0a6954a2f1c3
Publikováno v:
International game theory review. World Scientific Press
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::65a2df3f888185815776e74f7a038d9c
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923400017
https://doi.org/10.1142/s0219198923400017
Based on the deal-by-deal principle, we propose preference indices as a starting point for the analysis of rational choice. They specify how good acts are as a deal. Thus, the recognition of reference points in Prospect Theory is interpreted as a cru
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::09f935c09fa6f939ea0ff2c963c94d7d
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/the-dealbydeal-principle-for-rational-choice-on-the-qui-vive(875004c7-1b93-4e0b-8494-ca1cc1be2018).html
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/the-dealbydeal-principle-for-rational-choice-on-the-qui-vive(875004c7-1b93-4e0b-8494-ca1cc1be2018).html
Autor:
Harmelink, Rogier, Joosten, Reinoud
In non-cooperative stochastic games, the threat point is the lowest possible Nash equilibrium when players force each other to receive the minimal reward possible. For repeated games the determination of the threat point seems trivial, but when looki
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=narcis______::d266ea1b16e12604438433e1dad4e55c
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/1bc7c5be-0347-4359-99d4-6d1c9839f12b
https://research.utwente.nl/en/publications/1bc7c5be-0347-4359-99d4-6d1c9839f12b