Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 16
pro vyhledávání: '"Jonathan W. Leland"'
Autor:
Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 6, Iss 4, Pp 521-559 (2015)
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent’s pa
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/74f77b01d3ad446bb1fc659e9b989c41
Autor:
Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland
Publikováno v:
Judgment and Decision Making, Vol 10, Pp 123-129 (2015)
The problems of how self-interested players can cooperate despite incentives to defect, and how players can coordinate despite the presence of multiple equilibria, are among the oldest and most fundamental in game theory. In this report, we demonstra
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b8873b18d6004d0ca2f85d86482f3603
Autor:
Jonathan W. Leland, Mark Schneider
Publikováno v:
Experimental Economics. 24:1215-1241
The axioms of expected utility and discounted utility theory have been tested extensively. In contrast, the axioms of social welfare functions have only been tested in a few questionnaire studies involving choices between hypothetical income distribu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e515b92e0e3b636934347b9d80a7e302
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09695-3
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10683-020-09695-3
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 65:4318-4335
Behavior differs between transparent and nontransparent presentations of decisions, but “transparent presentation” has not been precisely defined. We formally define “transparent frames” for risk and time, establish their uniqueness, provide
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e5592b3f5e0dd263f74196357d79853e
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3167
https://doi.org/10.1287/mnsc.2018.3167
Publikováno v:
Journal of Risk and Uncertainty. 57:133-151
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::052216ebf072f74dea12a4ff80c76d83
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-018-9290-6
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11166-018-9290-6
Autor:
Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Psychology. 65:75-89
Since the classic work of Schelling, the notion of a focal point has been widely applied to explain coordinated behavior. However, focal points remain largely outside the formal apparatus of game theory. This paper develops a model of play in 2 × 2
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6b82dae962f8f7fd176764c2be3e7c2f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.03.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.joep.2018.03.002
Autor:
Mark Schneider, Jonathan W. Leland
Publikováno v:
Games, Vol 6, Iss 4, Pp 521-559 (2015)
Games
Volume 6
Issue 4
Pages 521-559
Games
Volume 6
Issue 4
Pages 521-559
We present a model of boundedly rational play in single-shot 2 × 2 games. Players choose strategies based on the perceived salience of their own payoffs and, if own-payoff salience is uninformative, on the perceived salience of their opponent’s pa
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6526170815c722ecc0a7537eb0598852
http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/4/521
http://www.mdpi.com/2073-4336/6/4/521
Autor:
Jonathan W. Leland
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral Decision Making. 26:418-428
Rubinstein (1988, 2003) and Leland (1994, 1998, 2001, 2002) have shown that choices based on similarity judgments will account for the vast majority of observed violations of expected and discounted utility. In this paper, I show that such judgments
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::976a2ef6ee36d8af278c51784de0fc9a
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1772
https://doi.org/10.1002/bdm.1772
Autor:
Jonathan W. Leland
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Socio-Economics. 39:568-577
In this paper I propose that the development of descriptive theories of choice in economics has been profoundly influenced by an arbitrary and seemly innocuous decision as to how to present risky choices to experimental subjects. This decision to rep
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::6b2c55d7a92229b3d519fc4ce856ea8e
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.009
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2009.05.009
Autor:
Jonathan W. Leland
Publikováno v:
Economic Inquiry. 40:574-581
I. INTRODUCTION Evidence accumulated over many years reveals the inadequacies of the Expected Utility Hypothesis as a descriptive model of choice under uncertainty. Over a much shorter period of time, evidence has accumulated revealing systematic vio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b9c01f284f0f4d2918f6a2ec5103f6b0
https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/40.4.574
https://doi.org/10.1093/ei/40.4.574