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pro vyhledávání: '"John R. Conlon"'
Publikováno v:
International Economic Review.
Autor:
John R. Conlon, Paul Pecorino
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Esteban and Ray (2001) develop a model with an increasing marginal cost of contribution and overturn the Olson hypothesis that large groups are unable to provide themselves with a rival public good. Pecorino and Temimi (2008) consider fixed, but avoi
Autor:
Feng Liu, John R. Conlon
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 175:38-57
We show that there exist models with rational agents, three periods, and five states of the world, which have a strong bubble in one of these states. However, no finite-horizon rational strong bubble model, with standard Walrasian markets, can have f
Autor:
John R. Conlon
Publikováno v:
The RAND Journal of Economics. 48:1027-1043
Autor:
John R. Conlon
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 77:249-278
This paper presents simple new multisignal generalizations of the two classic methods used to justify the first-order approach to moral hazard principal-agent problems, and compares these two approaches with each other. The paper first discusses limi
Publikováno v:
Decision Support Systems. 38:141-159
This paper discusses appropriate application areas for natural language interfaces (NLIs) to databases. This requires comparing NLIs with competing approaches, including other user-friendly interfaces, and training of users with less user-friendly in
Autor:
John R. Conlon, Paul Pecorino
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 120:123-142
We investigate policy reform in a modelwith both lobbying, which involves afree-rider problem, and ordinary rentseeking, which does not. These activitiesinvolve similar skills, so a reform whichreduces rents shifts labor into lobbying.Also, because o
Autor:
John R. Conlon
Publikováno v:
Econometrica. 72:927-936
An asymmetric information model of a finite horizon “nth order” rational asset price bubble is presented, where (all agents know that)n the asset is worthless. Also, the model has only two agents, so the first order version of the bubble is simpl
Autor:
John R. Conlon
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 112:35-65
This paper considers learning rates in finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas. If players think their opponents might be relatively cooperative (e.g., tit-for-tat or grim types), they will cooperate in finitely repeated prisoners’ dilemmas (see Kr
Autor:
John R. Conlon, Paul Pecorino
Publikováno v:
Economic Inquiry. 36:590-602
I. INTRODUCTION The export-led growth performance of the East Asian newly industrialized countries has increased interest in liberalization among developing countries in general. Such reforms are felt to benefit the economy, not only because they red