Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 29
pro vyhledávání: '"John M, Bizjak"'
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 77:2949-2986
Maintaining economic output during the COVID-19 pandemic results in benefits for firm shareholders but comes at a potential cost to public health. Using store-level data, we examine how a CEO's political leaning impacts this trade-off. We document th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::20f6e34a1e0af43972fcc8abb90e42ac
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13173
https://doi.org/10.1111/jofi.13173
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Maintaining economic output during COVID-19 pandemic can result in benefits for a firm’s shareholders but comes at a potential cost to public health. Using store-level data, we examine how a CEO’s political leanings, measured by political donatio
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::04686984c43663c584f34ef39e39132f
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3674512
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3674512
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Many of the events that trigger clawback provisions are associated with risky corporate policies and variable performance outcomes. We propose and test the hypothesis that clawback provisions motivate managers to reduce firm risk. Panel ordinary leas
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::190d4bd73ff6e8be18f09d8ae10e40e4
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3382498
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3382498
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We find that firms that grant performance-contingent (p-c) equity awards with accounting-based vesting conditions to their CEOs have lower cost of debt and less restrictive loan terms. The benefits of p-c accounting-based awards on debt financing are
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cea7e8237e2ad5e5efe93b92c2e1797e
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2924877
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2924877
Publikováno v:
Financial Management. 44:655-683
We examine different types of derivative instruments used by corporate insiders. These instruments are more likely to be used when there is greater insider ownership and greater capital market scrutiny. While these instruments may be allowed by board
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::8eb6e840a58b3ca132750e6d20d6c30f
https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12083
https://doi.org/10.1111/fima.12083
Publikováno v:
Accounting and Finance Research. 5
Of late, both U.S. and International firms have increased the granting of performance-contingent equity awards to their executive officers. Beyond simple stock options, these awards frequently include accounting-based performance targets. Failure to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cdc730af475ecc520f4afcd34d1086c1
https://doi.org/10.5430/afr.v5n1p164
https://doi.org/10.5430/afr.v5n1p164
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f626f49f37c6e3792b0b7ec37710393c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2833309
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2833309
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 100:538-555
Companies can potentially use compensation peer groups to inflate pay by choosing peers that are larger, choosing a high target pay percentile, or choosing peer firms with high pay. Although peers are largely selected based on characteristics that re
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3a3715270c9666723bcc6caa0e76de94
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2011.02.007
Publikováno v:
Review of Financial Studies. 22:4821-4847
We examine the role of board connections in explaining how the controversial practice of backdating employee stock options spread to a large number of firms across a wide range of industries. The increase in the likelihood that a firm begins to backd
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::e04928e14f2fe522437c15c661516416
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn120
https://doi.org/10.1093/rfs/hhn120
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial Economics. 90:152-168
We provide empirical evidence on how the practice of competitive benchmarking affects chief executive officer (CEO) pay. We find that the use of benchmarking is widespread and has a significant impact on CEO compensation. One view is that benchmarkin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::b324c39e18178403232501c591abfe29
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jfineco.2007.08.007