Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 94
pro vyhledávání: '"John L, Turner"'
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Law and Economics. 63:203-238
In paragraph iv pharmaceutical cases, a patent-litigation decision often determines whether a brand-firm monopoly continues or generic entry occurs. Using unique patent-litigation data and ...
Autor:
Emanuel Ornelas, John L. Turner
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In liability lawsuits (e.g., patent infringement), a plaintiff demands compensation from a defendant, and the parties often negotiate a settlement to avoid a costly trial. Liability insurance creates bargaining leverage for the defendant in this sett
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::270aa2c09c0620443550d77dd39485ad
https://hdl.handle.net/10453/145702
https://hdl.handle.net/10453/145702
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Industrial Economics. 66:866-903
We identify the rate of off-label use of prescription drugs in the United States during 1993-2008. We apply Detection Controlled Estimation to a comprehensive cross-section of prescriptions and find that rates of off-label use rise from 30.2% to 39.1
Autor:
John L. Turner
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 56:168-203
I introduce and analyze an equilibrium model of discovery, innovation, patenting and infringement. Firms that innovate must adapt complementary inputs, and are ex ante uncertain about whether adaptations will be costly and whether they will infringe
Autor:
Carlos S. Alvarado, Michael Grosso, John L. Turner, Ryan D. Foster, Randy Moore, Alton Higgins, Hugh Cunningham, F. David Peat, Greg Ealick, Michael E. Tymn, Guy Lyon Playfair, Michael Schmicker, Horace Crater, Stephen C. Jett, Daniel Sheehan, Henry H. Bauer
Publikováno v:
Journal of Scientific Exploration, Vol 25, Iss 1 (2011)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d1ddc73df27f461698a5a23a5b67c748
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 137:457-475
We identify welfare-optimal patent royalties in a model of costly imitation, entry and imperfect competition. When the social planner may impose a compulsory license, optimal royalties either blockade imitation, facilitating unregulated monopoly, or
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
In a patent infringement suit, the alleged infringer wins with a ruling of either patent invalidity or non-infringement. It is ambiguous which of these outcomes is preferred by the alleged infringer. Invalidity may increase current-period competition
Autor:
John L. Turner, Matthew D. Henry
Publikováno v:
Journal of Empirical Legal Studies. 13:454-486
We use structural break analysis to estimate rates of patent validity and infringement in decisions on the merits in U.S. courts over 1929–2006. We separately estimate these rates for district court and appeals court decisions. We find multiple str