Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 18
pro vyhledávání: '"John Cadigan"'
Autor:
Ming Wah Tham, Luca Stringhetti, Karl C. Geist, John Cadigan, David Fadeley, Chris Browne, Heather Feli, Clement Lee, Jeffrey Brown, Louis-Emmanuel Romana, Myra Parsons Gross, Maz Kusunoki, Lauren Stolzar, Al Meyer, Heidi Davidz, Brad Spencer
Publikováno v:
INCOSE International Symposium. 30:574-588
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f74e720a2b8f9dd8efaf8bff27f684fc
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2334-5837.2020.00741.x
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2334-5837.2020.00741.x
Publikováno v:
Journal of Behavioral and Experimental Economics. 49:44-53
We examine laboratory bargaining experiments with symmetric and asymmetric delay costs and options for proposers to credibly commit to a bargaining position. Contrary to standard game-theoretic predictions, our experimental results suggest that commi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::3cecacd73af1a0e0f553924f154c91e5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2014.02.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2014.02.005
Publikováno v:
The B.E. Journal of Economic Analysis & Policy. 13:485-524
This paper examines the behavior in multilateral bargaining experiments with alternating offers and asymmetric information. In all experiments, a single buyer has up to ten bargaining periods to purchase one unit of a good from each of two sellers. T
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::bff1de4b758ade74f449a5b42c7202d2
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0054
https://doi.org/10.1515/bejeap-2012-0054
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization. 80:523-531
We examine voluntary contributions in a two-stage public good experiment with ‘carryover.’ In two treatments, each subject's second-stage endowment is determined by the return from the public good in the first-stage. We manipulate payoffs across
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::64890bf28afd228102cccc9dbe9a620f
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jebo.2011.05.010
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Socio-Economics. 37:998-1009
Student volunteers at the U.S. Naval Academy (USNA) participated in one of the following one-shot games: a dictator game, an ultimatum game, a trust game, or a prisoner's dilemma game. We find limited support for the importance of personality type fo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0705f06f2ac40858110d0a3e7c49e380
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.065
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.socec.2006.12.065
Publikováno v:
Southern Economic Journal. 74:811-818
In a simple double-blind dictator experiment, systematically removing subjects’ levels of power and entitlement increases their choice of an income distribution generally consistent with Rawls (1971) concept of distributive justice, although choice
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::531b6221eff28359639b0f4abb2b2b96
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00865.x
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2008.tb00865.x
Autor:
John Cadigan
Publikováno v:
Southern Economic Journal. 74:85-103
This paper presents a two-stage team rent-seeking model with a contest prize that is not excludable among winning team members. When early effort is a perfect substitute for late effort, early actors can free ride on their late-moving teammates. Howe
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::856ce4f24b8e81a848ab96e5ba3412c9
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00828.x
https://doi.org/10.1002/j.2325-8012.2007.tb00828.x
Autor:
John Cadigan
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 8:555-569
This essay evaluates two provisions in the Bipartisan Campaign Reform Act (BCRA): raising contribution limits and banning soft money. The model highlights the importance of marginal cost ratios for candidates and their parties. The results suggest th
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9abdabc53f36935344705e507b570cf5
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00278.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9779.2006.00278.x
Autor:
John Cadigan
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 123:197-216
Citizen candidate models represent a significant advance in the analysis of public choice. They provide added realism to models of endogenous policy formation, relate the number of candidates to the benefits and costs associated with electoral compet
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9f9c37ebc3f1903f7c76017e42cc3e13
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0262-4
https://doi.org/10.1007/s11127-005-0262-4
Publikováno v:
Economics of Governance. 5:187-211
The majority of theoretical and experimental research stemming from Tullock’s (1980) model of rent-seeking considers static, single-period contests. This paper contributes to a growing body of research on multi-period rent-seeking contests by devel
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::15057bd7d74ec2ed43f4ea585de41f92
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-004-0075-9
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10101-004-0075-9