Zobrazeno 1 - 10 of 71 pro vyhledávání: '"Joel Watson"'
1
Akademický článek
Contract and Game Theory: Basic Concepts for Settings with Finite Horizons
Autor: Joel Watson
Publikováno v: Games, Vol 4, Iss 3, Pp 457-496 (2013)
This paper examines a general model of contract in multi-period settings with both external and self-enforcement. In the model, players alternately engage in contract negotiation and take individual actions. A notion of contractual equilibrium, which
Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/d83d66edb267472cb29dc6a4f16c59d7
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2
Akademický článek
The Renegotiation-Proofness Principle and Costly Renegotiation
Autor: James R. Brennan, Joel Watson
Publikováno v: Games, Vol 4, Iss 3, Pp 347-366 (2013)
We study contracting and costly renegotiation in settings of complete, but unverifiable information, using the mechanism-design approach. We show how renegotiation activity is best modeled in the fundamentals of the mechanism-design framework, so tha
Externí odkaz: https://doaj.org/article/0ebe45797136456c8ff479fd84281b84
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3
Elektronická kniha
Tinnitus: Epidemiology, Causes and Emerging Therapeutic Treatments
Autor: Joël Watson
Tinnitus is not a disease, but rather a symptom or condition characterized by a conscious perception of an unreal sound in the absence of external auditory stimulus. This ontological condition can modify everyday life in different ways: causing distr
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4
Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement
Autor: David Miller, Joel Watson, Trond E. Olsen
Publikováno v: American Economic Review, vol 110, iss 7
Miller, DA; Olsen, TE; & Watson, J. (2018). Relational Contracting, Negotiation, and External Enforcement. NHH Dept. of Business and Management Science Discussion Paper, (2018). UC San Diego: Retrieved from: http://www.escholarship.org/uc/item/6ts1j6hf
AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW, vol 110, iss 7
We study relational contracting and renegotiation in environments with external enforcement of long-term contractual arrangements. An external, long-term contract governs the stage games the contracting parties will play in the future (depending on v
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d66cec812bf75f86e22256bb455217e5
https://doi.org/10.1257/aer.20180427
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6
Theoretical Foundations of Relational Incentive Contracts
Autor: Joel Watson
Publikováno v: Annual Review of Economics, vol 13, iss 1
This article describes the emerging game-theoretic framework for modeling long-term contractual relationships with moral hazard. The framework combines self-enforcement and external enforcement, accommodating alternative assumptions regarding how act
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b3535b7d03083660f70082f8a7032a48
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/19f9w2xf
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8
Conservation agreements: Relational contracts with endogenous monitoring
Autor: Dale Squires, David Miller, Eduard Niesten, Theodore Groves, Heidi Gjertsen, Joel Watson
Publikováno v: Journal of Law, Economics, and Organization, vol 37, iss 1
The Journal of Law Economics and Organization, vol 37, iss 1
Author(s): Gjertsen, H; Groves, T; Miller, DA; Niesten, E; Squires, D; Watson, J | Abstract: This article examines the structure and performance of conservation agreements, which are relational contracts used across the world to protect natural resou
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::2449a51e5ba1dbdb1fc730162ff45b24
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6zq3g110
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9
On the outside-option principle with one-sided options
Autor: Joel Watson
This note examines a bargaining game in which a single player has an outside option that can be taken in any period of time. If the outside-option value is close to the efficient frontier, then there exist equilibria that contravene the “outside-op
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::a1bffe5ebfca2597eb36fb35f781a2d8
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/6k8699dv
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10
Statistical evidence and the problem of robust litigation
Autor: Jesse Bull, Joel Watson
Publikováno v: RAND JOURNAL OF ECONOMICS, vol 50, iss 4
The RAND Journal of Economics, vol 50, iss 4
We propose a new model of disclosure, interpretation, and management of hard evidence in the context of litigation and similar applications. A litigant has private information and may also possess hard evidence that can be disclosed to a fact‐finde
Externí odkaz: https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1586b1fa5fc95ad17b3f49b69bb42150
https://escholarship.org/uc/item/4110q2cb
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