Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 27
pro vyhledávání: '"Joel Sandonís"'
Autor:
Joel Sandonís, Chrysovalantou Milliou
Publikováno v:
Review of International Economics. 28:884-912
According to conventional wisdom, multinational enterprises (MNEs) undertake vertical FDI to take advantage of cross‐border factor cost differences and source inputs from abroad at better terms. However, recent empirical studies document many insta
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::516acbd449a06900eee53b7e7dea9886
https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12474
https://doi.org/10.1111/roie.12474
Autor:
Ramon Fauli‐Oller, Joel Sandonís
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We consider a symmetric homogeneous Cournot duopoly operating under increasing marginal costs. One of the firms owns a patented superior technology that reduces the intercept of the marginal cost function. We compare the incentives of the insider pat
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d14561fde5f3ac53f9918a86e8b8f4fe
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/124145
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/124145
Autor:
Ramón Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We consider two manufacturers producing two symmetric and independent goods. They sell them through two undifferentiated retailers (homogeneous retailers). Manufacturers propose linear contracts. Before supply contracts are set by producers, retailer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::f14bd7a71a8c14b97f19302c2e74e5de
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/114610
http://hdl.handle.net/10045/114610
Autor:
Ramón Faulí-Oller, Joel Sandonís
Publikováno v:
Handbook of Game Theory and Industrial Organization, Volume II. :7-33
This second volume of the Handbook includes original contribution by experts in the field. It provides up-to-date surveys of the most relevant applications of game theory to industrial organization. The book covers both classical as well as new IO to
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::923de44fb0d50bb740fe279c230664f5
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789.00008
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781788112789.00008
Autor:
Chrysovalantou Milliou, Joel Sandonís
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We study the incentives of final product manufacturers to introduce new products into the market and the impact of a manufacturer merger on them. We show that when manufacturers distribute their products through multi-product retailers, a manufacture
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bcb70ba2e84898b7a1a3d3b5fbe74f45
https://hdl.handle.net/10045/73691
https://hdl.handle.net/10045/73691
Autor:
Gosálbez, Maite Pastor, Dı́ez, Joel Sandonı́s *
Publikováno v:
In Journal of Economic Behavior and Organization 2000 42(3):385-404
Autor:
Mayra Rebolledo, Joel Sandonís
Publikováno v:
Economics of Innovation and New Technology. 21:815-825
In this paper, the effectiveness of R&D subsidies is analyzed in an oligopolistic model that we apply to the cases of international R&D competition and cooperation. We find that the existence of asymmetric information among firms on whether a rival (
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::358d3670947d08bd9c11f3e1771f7d86
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2012.671997
https://doi.org/10.1080/10438599.2012.671997
Publikováno v:
The Manchester School. 81:803-827
In this paper we get the optimal two-part tariff contract for the licensing of a cost reducing innovation to a differentiated goods industry of a general size. We analyze the cases where the patentee is an independent laboratory or an incumbent firm.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::d4ce4ebfe504ff7e4f0e653039a0b6ad
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02311.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2012.02311.x
Publikováno v:
The Manchester School. 79:884-898
In this paper, we show that downstream mergers increase the incentives of an up-stream firm to invest in cost-reducing R&D. The upstream firm revenues increase with industry profits, which in turn increase with concentration downstream and this expla
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::31a72631562c0bfc610c979a402d17f1
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02209.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1467-9957.2010.02209.x
Publikováno v:
RUA. Repositorio Institucional de la Universidad de Alicante
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
Universidad de Alicante (UA)
We analyze third degree price discrimination by an upstream monopolist to a continuum of heterogeneous downstream firms. The novelty of our approach is to recognize that customizing prices may be costly. As a consequence, partial price discrimination
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b3b5bf27e518a908c96ea7c1135b9511
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-010-0030-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s13209-010-0030-7