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pro vyhledávání: '"Joe Roussos"'
Autor:
Joe Roussos
Publikováno v:
Ethical Theory and Moral Practice. 25:865-889
This is a paper about the methodology of normative ethics. I claim that much work in normative ethics can be interpreted as modelling, the form of inquiry familiar from science, involving idealised representations. I begin with the anti-theory debate
Autor:
Joe Roussos
There is now a large literature on values in science, discussing whether andhow science can be objective while realistically acknowledging andmanaging the impact of values in the production of scientific information.In this paper, I am concerned with
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::57ee043d3074e2b0cbc046ff7ff96eb1
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/r2vxb
https://doi.org/10.31235/osf.io/r2vxb
Autor:
Julie Jebeile, Joe Roussos
Publikováno v:
WIREs Climate Change.
Publikováno v:
Philosophy of Science. 88:439-460
Many policy decisions take input from collections of scientific models. Such decisions face significant and often poorly understood uncertainty. We rework the so-called confidence approach to tackle decision-making under severe uncertainty with multi
Autor:
Joe Roussos
Publikováno v:
Synthese. 199:3457-3484
When an agent learns of an expert’s credence in a proposition about which they are an expert, the agent should defer to the expert and adopt that credence as their own. This is a popular thought about how agents ought to respond to (ideal) experts.
Publikováno v:
Synthese Library ISBN: 9783031013140
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::ba75f9e8ae838a88fa27704a790f0356
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01315-7_3
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-031-01315-7_3
Autor:
Joe Roussos
Publikováno v:
The British Journal for the Philosophy of Science.
Autor:
Richard Bradley, Joe Roussos
Publikováno v:
LSE Public Policy Review. 1
The UK has been ‘following the science’ in response to the COVID-19 pandemic in line with the national framework for the use of scientific advice in assessment of risk. We argue that the way in which it does so is unsatisfactory in two important