Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 60
pro vyhledávání: '"Joana Resende"'
Autor:
Felipe Martins Pastor, Jeniffer Adelaide Adão, Paula Salve Guizardi, Joana Resende Paglis Brunoro
Publikováno v:
Pubvet, Vol 12, Iss 8, Pp 1-7 (2018)
A cisticercose é considerada como umas das principais parasitoses que acarretam em prejuízos econômicos na cadeia da carne atualmente. Além disso, a doença se configura como importante zoonose em Saúde Pública, devido à severidade das implica
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/af9ef780f6794358862168969735d984
Autor:
Joana Resende
Publikováno v:
Opus, Vol 15, Iss 2, Pp 43-60 (2009)
Déjàvu,or better,déjà écouté is an appropriate expression to describe an audition of certain works by Francis Poulenc (1899-1963). A sui-generis character in 20th century music, Poulenc has questioned the whole heritage that came before h
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/717a1662cc3f4f2cab86831b81078a0e
Publikováno v:
Management Science
Management Science, 2023, 69 (6), pp.3602-3615. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2022.4511⟩
Management Science, 2023, 69 (6), pp.3602-3615. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2022.4511⟩
We consider a nondurable good monopolist that collects data on its customers in order to profile them and subsequently practice price discrimination on returning customers. The monopolist’s price discrimination scheme is leaky in the sense that an
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::561608f60988f69fa44a7996884c552f
https://amu.hal.science/hal-04019356
https://amu.hal.science/hal-04019356
Autor:
Luiz Fernandes Montes, Milton Ghedini Cardoso, Marcos Aurélio Lopes, Adilson de Paula Almeida Aguiar, Joana Resende Paglis Brunoro, Henrique Salomão Queiroz, Mônica Auxiliadora Mesquita Cardoso
Publikováno v:
Archivos Latinoamericanos de Producción Animal. 30:1-7
The objective of this study was to evaluate the effect of the frequency of provision of protein energy supplementation on pasture during the dry period of the year on the performance of Nelore steers in rearing phase. FAZU teaching school conducted t
Autor:
Didier Laussel, Joana Resende
Publikováno v:
Management Science
Management Science, 2022, 68 (12), pp.8872-8888. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298⟩
Management Science, 2022, 68 (12), pp.8872-8888. ⟨10.1287/mnsc.2022.4298⟩
This paper investigates duopoly competition when horizontally differentiated firms are able to make personalized product-price offers to returning customers, within a behavior-based discrimination model. In the second period, firms can profile old cu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7d69f2cf1cbadfc0422e86133e0f16f7
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03740642
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03740642
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2022, 31 (3), pp.579-608. ⟨10.1111/jems.12479⟩
Journal of Economics and Management Strategy, 2022, 31 (3), pp.579-608. ⟨10.1111/jems.12479⟩
International audience; Using a Markov-perfect equilibrium model, we show that the use of customer data to practice intertemporal price discrimination will improve monopoly profit if and only if information precision is higher than a certain threshol
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::08b50a48929ce41e149c399098f13301
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03665780/document
https://hal-amu.archives-ouvertes.fr/hal-03665780/document
Autor:
Gil Gonçalves, João Pego, Elisio Costa, Joana Resende, Paul Hatton, Manuel Gandoy-Crego, David Facal, Petr Dolezel, Ladislav Routil, Jan Pospichal, Eduard Shevtshenko, Gabriela Teodorescu, Maria Oliveira, Ana Leal, Marco Duarte
Publikováno v:
EDULEARN Proceedings.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 22:1740-1745
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economic Theory. 21:1200-1220
This paper provides a thorough second‐best welfare analysis of the standard two‐stage model of R&D/product market competition with R&D spillovers. The planner's solution is compared to the standard non‐cooperative scenario, the R&D cartel, and