Zobrazeno 1 - 5
of 5
pro vyhledávání: '"João Vergilio Gallerani Cuter"'
Publikováno v:
Philósophos : Revista de Filosofia, Vol 14, Iss 2, Pp 33-62 (2010)
In the Tractatus Logico-Philosophicus, a name is always a propositional function. Wittgenstein makes a radical shift in the Fregean opposition between saturated and unsaturated entities. Any sentential component which is not itself a sentence is unsa
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/dfec2b7075bb461c805126152e2514fc
Publikováno v:
DoisPontos, Vol 6, Iss 1, Pp 181-193 (2009)
It is easy to show that, in the Tractatus, color ascriptions cannot be elementary propositions. But it is not so easy to determine which kind of analysis could be made of judgments of perception like "a is red". Wittgenstein gives us a kind of hint o
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/362b9c88d102448ca00b4066f87d22a0
Publikováno v:
DoisPontos, Vol 6, Iss 2, Pp 129-144 (2009)
Wittgenstein objective is to show that Russell’s Theory of Types is condemned to self dissolution. It can only be presented through statements which violate the very rules the theory intends to impinge on the whole of language. On the other hand, i
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c03edfbac5e5447aae0c0fedee2af643
Publikováno v:
Philósophos : Revista de Filosofia, Vol 8, Iss 1 (2007)
A relação nome–objeto, no Tractatus, exige a atuação de uma vontade. Um sujeito deve “escolher” qual objeto associar a um nome dado. Essa escolha não pode ser descrita – não pode ser um fato no interior do mundo. Do mesmo modo, o suje
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/3fe345d0e9ea4950bcb919ab51dbaeb8
Publikováno v:
Theoría Revista del Colegio de Filosofía, Iss 8-9 (1999)
The paper is an interpretation of the critique of the Russellian theory of judgment, in Wittgenstein’s Tractatus [5.5422]. The author holds that the picture theory of language is the Wittgensteinian alternative to Russell’s theory of types, on wh
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/b9ef71d3e2e741d2aaf8720abe1900ab