Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 40
pro vyhledávání: '"Jhy-yuan Shieh"'
Publikováno v:
Economic Modelling. 87:254-266
This paper builds a two-sector, two-factor environmental model in which agents optimally choose the clean and dirty goods in order to display their social status. In contrast to the conventional notion, we show that greater social aspirations in cons
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 17:151-168
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 15:95-107
This paper quantitatively examines the interrelations between sectoral composition of government spending and macroeconomic (in)stability in a two-sector real business cycle model with positive productive externalities in investment and distortionary
Publikováno v:
Journal of Environmental Economics and Management. 88:35-68
This paper develops a dynamic two-good (clean and dirty goods), two-sector model to explore the implications of the macroeconomic environmental rebound/backfire effect for environmentally-friendly product promotions on not only the demand side (a sub
Publikováno v:
B.E. Journal of Macroeconomics. 2015, Vol. 15 Issue 1, p223-253. 31p. 3 Graphs.
Publikováno v:
International Review of Economics & Finance. 34:151-160
This paper develops an endogenous growth model to examine the linkages between environmental consciousness and economic growth. It is found that macroeconomic instability can arise in a simple AK-type growth model when the pollution externality is pr
Publikováno v:
International Review of Economics & Finance. 29:569-584
By incorporating a keeping-up-with-the-Joneses preference into the Redux model, this paper sketches the implications of consumption externalities for the short-run and long-run equilibria. We show that the size of the consumption externality plays a
Publikováno v:
Taipei Economic Inquiry. Jan2008, Vol. 44 Issue 1, p1-29. 29p.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economics. 2000, Vol. 72 Issue 3, p263-273. 11p. 1 Graph.
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 8:345-359
This paper sets up a dynamic model with a keeping-up-with-the Joneses preference and market imperfections. Two important questions are investigated: (i) under what circumstances and for what reason should the optimal tax be state-varying? (ii) what a