Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 240
pro vyhledávání: '"Jesse C Johnson"'
Autor:
Jesse C Johnson, Scott Wolford
Publikováno v:
Journal of Conflict Resolution. 67:617-641
States form defensive alliances hoping to deter adversaries and avoid war. However, scholars and policy analysts often worry that if an alliance fails to deter the promise of military support will encourage escalation, pushing disputants closer to wa
Publikováno v:
International Organization. 75:837-857
In the current era, many of the military threats that state leaders face come from domestic and transnational nonstate actors. Military alliances are recognized as an important policy strategy to counter military threats, but existing research has pr
Autor:
Daina Chiba, Jesse C. Johnson
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics. 81:1466-1479
Forming a military coalition during an international crisis can improve a state’s chances of achieving its political goals. We argue that the involvement of a coalition, however, can have unintende...
Autor:
Jesse C. Johnson, Stephen Joiner
Publikováno v:
Conflict Management and Peace Science. 38:178-199
A primary motivation for forming military alliances is to deter adversaries. However, some alliances are more effective at deterrence than others. Deterrence theory suggests that an alliance may fail to deter if the commitment is not considered credi
Autor:
Jesse C. Johnson
Publikováno v:
International Studies Quarterly. 61:736-745
Autor:
Jesse C. Johnson, Brett Ashley Leeds
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics. 79:335-340
Kenwick, Vasquez, and Powers question whether empirical evidence supports the claim that defense pacts deter conflict as our prior research has concluded. We review the theoretical argument for why defense pacts should deter conflict and consider the
Autor:
Jesse C. Johnson
Publikováno v:
International Studies Review. 23:209-210
Autor:
Jesse C. Johnson
Publikováno v:
Conflict Management and Peace Science. 33:451-468
Theories of alliance formation and war suggest that alliances influence the probability that a potential challenger will initiate a militarized interstate dispute. This is because alliances are expected to influence their members’ likelihood of int
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Politics. 77:968-982
Evidence suggests that leaders of democratic states experience high costs from violating past commitments. We argue that because democratic leaders foresee the costs of violation, they are careful to design agreements they expect to have a high proba
Autor:
Jesse C. Johnson
Publikováno v:
Journal of Peace Research. 52:665-679
It is well recognized that military alliances can provide their members with important security benefits. However, less attention has been paid to the policy concessions states must grant others to enter into military alliances. To study this aspect