Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 36
pro vyhledávání: '"Jeroen M. Swinkels"'
Autor:
Larry Samuelson, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics, Vol 1, Iss 1, Pp 119-142 (2006)
Human utility embodies a number of seemingly irrational aspects. The leading example in this paper is that utilities often depend on the presence of salient unchosen alternatives. Our focus is to understand why an evolutionary process might optimally
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/1de277f1a977427bbb1b87d557976336
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 15:715-761
Consider an agent who can costlessly add mean‐preserving noise to his output. To deter such risk‐taking, the principal optimally offers a contract that makes the agent's utility concave in output. If the agent is risk‐neutral and protected by l
Autor:
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Hector Chade
We define and explore no‐upward‐crossing (NUC), a condition satisfied by every parameterized family of distributions commonly used in economic applications. Under smoothness assumptions, NUC is equivalent to log‐supermodularity of the negative
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::536e76fae724f7fb2832e8e5e72ff4f5
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253448
https://hdl.handle.net/10419/253448
Publikováno v:
Enterprise Rent-A-Car
An industry adage held that “there are two types of rental car companies: those that lose money and Enterprise.” The company that would become Enterprise Rent-A-Car was started in 1957 in St. Louis, Missouri, by Jack Taylor. Taylor set up Enterpr
Autor:
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Hector Chade
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 187:105032
We study the moral-hazard problem when the agent's reservation utility is large, but so is the agent's value to the principal. We show that the principal's cost of implementing effort has a very simple limiting form. For large enough outside option,
Autor:
Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 152:1-40
We provide a new set of tools for studying asymmetric …rst price auctions, connecting their equilibria to the �-concavity of the underlying type distributions, and showing how one can use surplus expressions related to symmetric auctions to bound
Autor:
Sofia Moroni, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 150:668-682
We provide a new class of counter-examples to existence in a simple moral hazard problem in which the first-order approach is valid. In contrast to the Mirrlees example, unbounded likelihood ratios on the signal technology are not central. Rather, ou
Autor:
Jeroen M. Swinkels, Ohad Kadan
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 82:468-489
Consider a moral hazard problem in which there is a constraint to pay the agent no less than some amount m . This paper studies the effect of changes in m on the effort that the principal chooses to induce from the agent. We present sufficient condit
Autor:
Ohad Kadan, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 148:2313-2343
We study the moral hazard problem without the first-order approach or other common structure. We present sufficient conditions under which the shadow value of simultaneously tightening the minimum payment and individual rationality constraints has a
Autor:
Vlad Mares, Jeroen M. Swinkels
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 43:487-514
We study procurement auctions in which, as is common in practice, a group of sellers (incumbents, qualified bidders) is given an advantage, based, for example, on better reliability, quality, or incumbency status. We show conditions under which for a