Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 23
pro vyhledávání: '"Jens Großer"'
Publikováno v:
Journal of Applied Mathematics, Vol 2015 (2015)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/71f66652c92a470795e29045ebb028f4
Autor:
Jens Großer
This chapter surveys voting game experiments that involve incomplete information with regard to voters’ opinions about what the best course of action might be and characteristics, especially their private costs and benefits related to decision maki
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::be8edbf5f6e3075b74a12cfd14feba1c
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785363337.00024
https://doi.org/10.4337/9781785363337.00024
Autor:
Jens Großer, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 61:761-763
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cca691ed228d426397fb18ee2e11fe5e
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12299
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12299
Autor:
Jens Großer
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::101dd3584600b50333927700a13cd3e5
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3279218
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3279218
Autor:
Michael Seebauer, Jens Großer
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We experimentally study compulsory majority voting over two alternatives in small committees. The committee members share a common interest, and each member decides on whether to buy a private signal about which alternative better suits their interes
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::700ac4cca12db26bc496a7b358b29508
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967805
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967805
Autor:
Thomas R. Palfrey, Jens Großer
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We report the results of a laboratory experiment based on a citizen–candidate model with private information about ideal points. Inefficient political polarization is observed in all treatments; that is, citizens with extreme ideal points enter as
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::41da2f83da7f595de0caa98e459f5763
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967635
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2967635
Autor:
Jens Großer, Thomas R. Palfrey
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 58:127-143
We study a citizen-candidate-entry model with private information about ideal points. We fully characterize the unique symmetric equilibrium of the entry game and show that only relatively “extreme” citizen types enter the electoral competition a
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e8a80957dbcbe25110c41e243a904a77
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12032
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12032
Autor:
Jens Großer, Ernesto Reuben
Publikováno v:
Journal of Public Economics. 101:39-52
We study the interaction between competitive markets and income redistribution that reallocates unequal pre-tax market incomes away from the rich to the poor majority. In one setup, participants earn their income by trading in a double auction (DA) w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5de3a086fa85e25d8d9705bec5a36f33
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.02.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jpubeco.2013.02.002
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 57:582-597
We experimentally study the common wisdom that money buys political influence. In the game, one special interest (i.e., a corporate firm) has the opportunity to influence redistributive tax policies in her favor by transferring money to two competing
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cf601c66aa315265b176dacddc772221
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12015
https://doi.org/10.1111/ajps.12015
Autor:
Jens Großer, Arthur Schram
Publikováno v:
American Journal of Political Science. 54:700-717
We experimentally study the impact of public opinion poll releases on voter turnout and welfare in a participation game. We find higher overall turnout rates when polls inform the electorate about the levels of support for the candidates than when po
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::32df077a51eea86a86a5309934bfe82a
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00455.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1540-5907.2010.00455.x