Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 17
pro vyhledávání: '"Jeff Buechner"'
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Studia Semiotyczne, Vol 34, Iss 1 (2020)
DOI: http://doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.06 Georg Kreisel (1972) suggested various ways out of the Gödel incompleteness theorems. His remarks on ways out were somewhat parenthetical, and suggestive. He did not develop them in subsequent papers. On
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a6bed479f14c4f0d8fe969b5d3116175
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Information, Vol 11, Iss 1, p 48 (2020)
In this paper the Buechner−Tavani model of digital trust is revised—new conditions for self-trust are incorporated into the model. These new conditions raise several philosophical problems concerning the idea of a substantial self for social robo
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/a0ca75a07c4642d296a024fb9fc1b72c
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Information, Vol 2, Iss 1, Pp 195-216 (2011)
Privacy issues in social and business e-networks are daunting in complexity—private information about oneself might be routed through countless artificial agents. For each such agent, in that context, two questions about trust are raised: Where an
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/f102923301354a91a9a7e8a29b11cbf8
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Information, Vol 9, Iss 10, p 256 (2018)
The purpose of this paper is to describe two new philosophical problems for robo-ethics. When one considers the kinds of philosophical problems that arise in the emerging field of robo-ethics, one typically thinks of issues that concern agency, auton
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/97481c63b48a4305b0e2cb2ebce96581
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
The first systematic examination of Hilary Putnam's arguments against computational functionalism challenges each of Putnam's main arguments.With mind-brain identity theories no longer dominant in philosophy of mind in the late 1950s, scientific mate
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Minds and Machines. 28:491-513
Kripke’s argument against functionalism extended to physical computers poses a deep philosophical problem (not previously addressed in the literature) for understanding the standard view of what computers are. The problem puts into jeopardy the def
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
ACM SIGCAS Computers and Society. 43:47-68
In this paper, I examine a key issue affecting trust in the context of a computing environment, as it affects human agents and artificial agents. Specifically, the paper focuses on the role that "resource conservation" plays in an analysis of moral t
Autor:
Herman T. Tavani, Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Ethics and Information Technology. 13:39-51
We argue that the notion of trust, as it figures in an ethical context, can be illuminated by examining research in artificial intelligence on multi-agent systems in which commitment and trust are modeled. We begin with an analysis of a philosophical
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Ethics and Information Technology. 12:363-370
Growing up in the late 1950’s in America, mechanical robots were part of my culture, but certainly not of industry (unless it was the toy industry, which capitalized on the delight young children—mostly boys—took in fictionalized hulking tons o
Autor:
Jeff Buechner
Publikováno v:
Journal of Biological Physics. 36:23-44
There are many kinds of limitative results in the sciences, some of which are philosophical. I am interested in examining one kind of limitative result in the neurosciences that is mathematical-a result secured by the Gödel incompleteness theorems.