Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 31
pro vyhledávání: '"Jean-Paul Décamps"'
Autor:
Jean-Paul Décamps, Stéphane Villeneuve
Publikováno v:
Finance and Stochastics
Finance and Stochastics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2019, 23 (1), pp.1-28. ⟨10.1007/s00780-018-0376-4⟩
Finance and Stochastics, Springer Verlag (Germany), 2019, 23 (1), pp.1-28. ⟨10.1007/s00780-018-0376-4⟩
International audience; We study a dynamic corporate finance contracting model in which the firm's profitability fluctuates and is impacted by the unobservable managerial effort. Thereby, we introduce in an agency framework the issue of strategic liq
Autor:
Jean-Paul Décamps, Stéphane Villeneuve
Publikováno v:
Revue d'économie financière. :231-240
Sous les effets conjoints d’une baisse des taux et d’une volonte politique de soutenir le financement de l’economie dans un environnement reglementaire contraignant pour les banques, la legislation autorise depuis 2012 les compagnies d’assura
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2019, 11 (2), pp.98-130. ⟨10.2139/ssrn.2201499⟩
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2019, 11 (2), pp.98-130. ⟨10.2139/ssrn.2201499⟩
International audience; We study competition in capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading. Perfect competition is impeded by entrepreneurs’ threat to borrow excessively from multiple lenders and to shirk. As
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::1ac53b9c02c816100cc87a48b7123238
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03342939
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-03342939
Publikováno v:
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, In press, ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12552⟩
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, 2019, 51 (4), pp.977-990. ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12552⟩
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, In press, ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12552⟩
Journal of Money, Credit and Banking, Wiley, 2019, 51 (4), pp.977-990. ⟨10.1111/jmcb.12552⟩
International audience; We study a credit market in which multiple lenders sequentially offer financing to a single borrower under moral hazard. We show that restricting lenders to post single offers involves a loss of generality: none of the equilib
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c07f0099ce5c595f8f1ef9d48ff48833
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02094833
https://halshs.archives-ouvertes.fr/halshs-02094833
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2019, 11 (2), pp.98-130. ⟨10.1257/mic.20170189⟩
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics, American Economic Association, 2019, 11 (2), pp.98-130. ⟨10.1257/mic.20170189⟩
We study competition in capital markets subject to moral hazard when investors cannot prevent side trading. Perfect competition is impeded by entrepreneurs’ threat to borrow excessively from multiple lenders and to shirk. As a consequence, investor
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::92d218c2cf675d4c06d5782087ccb906
https://hdl.handle.net/2108/314107
https://hdl.handle.net/2108/314107
Publikováno v:
The Review of Financial Studies, 30(1), 162-210. Oxford University Press
We model the financing, cash holdings, and hedging policies of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. The permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct, sometimes opposite, effects on corporate
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We model the financing, cash holdings, and hedging policies of a firm facing financing frictions and subject to permanent and transitory cash flow shocks. We show that permanent and transitory shocks generate distinct, sometimes opposite, effects on
Autor:
Stéphane Villeneuve, Jean-Paul Décamps
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Finance. 24:66-96
We thank Yann Braouezec, Darrell Duffie, Alexander Guembel, Monique Jeanblanc, Damien Lamberton, Thomas Mariotti, Sophie Moinas, Jean-Charles Rochet, Ekaterina Voltchkova, and especially Hayne Leland and Chris Rogers for very helpful discussions, whi
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 66:1501-1544
We develop a dynamic model of a firm facing agency costs of free cash flow and external financing costs. An explicit solution for the firm's optimal balance sheet dynamics is derived. Financial frictions affect issuance and dividend policies, the val
Autor:
Bertrand Djembissi, Jean-Paul Décamps
Publikováno v:
Annals of Finance. 3:389-409
We address the issue of modeling and quantifying the asset substitution problem in a setting where equityholders decisions alter both the volatility and the return of the firm cash flows. Our results contrast with those obtained in models where the a