Zobrazeno 1 - 8
of 8
pro vyhledávání: '"Javier Hervés-Estévez"'
Publikováno v:
Agricultural Economics (AGRICECON), Vol 70, Iss 2, Pp 91-100 (2024)
In Spain, the leader in pesticide sales in the European Union, a high-tech and innovative company provides services to the wine industry to optimise phytosanitary work, reduce crop losses and lower production costs. Although the nature of its busines
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/eb6db4aaec5c4fd490796370ad66b1ad
Autor:
Raquel Fernández-González, Marcos Pérez-Pérez, Javier Hervés-Estévez, María Dolores Garza-Gil
Publikováno v:
Ocean & Coastal Management. 221:106131
Galicia is the most important fishing region in Spain. Nearly 50% of the volume of catches and of the national fishing fleet are concentrated in this region. During the Covid-19 pandemic, the fishing sector had the status of an essential sector and w
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Economic Theory. 14:129-138
We give a notion of bargaining set for finite economies using Aubin’s (1979) veto and show its coincidence with the set of Walrasian allocations, providing a discrete approach to the characterization of competitive equilibria obtained by Mas-Colell
Publikováno v:
Economics Letters. 166:10-13
We provide a notion of bargaining set for finite economies where the proponents of objections (leaders) are endogenous. We show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations when the economy is replicated.
Publikováno v:
Journal of Mathematical Economics. 74:93-98
We provide a notion of bargaining set for a finite production economy based on a two-step veto mechanism a la Aubin (1979). We show that this bargaining set and the set of Walrasian allocations coincide. At the light of our result we refine Mas-Colel
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory. 66:327-341
We introduce a notion of bargaining set for finite economies and show its convergence to the set of Walrasian allocations.
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Game Theory. 44:631-645
In this paper we analyze the behavior of bargaining sets in continuum economies when there are restrictions on the formation of coalitions. We provide several characterizations of Vind’s (J Math Econ 21:89–97, 1992) bargaining set in terms of its
We consider consumers with the same reservation price, who desire to buy at most one unit of a good. Firms compete only in prices, but there are other features firms cannot control that would eventually lead an agent to buy in one firm or another. We
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::22b927797fb489378c08cc64dfc72ea5
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62302/1/MPRA_paper_62302.pdf
https://mpra.ub.uni-muenchen.de/62302/1/MPRA_paper_62302.pdf