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pro vyhledávání: '"Jason Konek"'
Autor:
Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Philosophical Studies
Autor:
Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7 ISBN: 0192868977
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7
Oxford Studies in Epistemology Volume 7
Confirmational holism is at odds with Jeffrey conditioning—the orthodox Bayesian policy for accommodating uncertain learning experiences. Two of the great insights of holist epistemology are that (i) the effects of experience ought to be mediated b
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::75883c0dfd290d334dd37d85d7d1e366
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192868978.003.0004
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192868978.003.0004
Autor:
Jason Konek, Catrin Campbell-Moore
Publikováno v:
Campbell-Moore, C & Konek, J 2019, ' Believing Probabilistic Contents : On the Expressive Power and Coherence of Sets of Sets of Probabilities ', Analysis Reviews . https://doi.org/10.1093/analys/anz076
Moss argues that rational agents are best thought of not as having degrees of belief in various propositions. Instead, they are best thought of as having beliefs in probabilistic contents. Probabilistic contents are sets of probability functions. Pro
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9b59feb6aff1fb40797464dae24ef2ef
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/84a33197-e006-46c1-a09d-fd8f60ae2f11
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/en/publications/84a33197-e006-46c1-a09d-fd8f60ae2f11
Autor:
Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Mind. 124:933-941
Autor:
Benjamin A. Levinstein, Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Konek, J & Levinstein, B 2017, ' The Foundations of Epistemic Decision Theory ', Mind . https://doi.org/10.1093/mind/fzw044
According to accuracy-first epistemology, accuracy is the fundamental epistemic good. Epistemic norms–Probabilism, Conditionalization, the Principal Principle, and so on–have their binding force in virtue of helping to secure this good. To make t
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::ee1c9dae1da891ff631cfe62e7d87fbd
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/166312154/Epistemic_Decision_Theory_POSTPRINT.pdf
https://research-information.bris.ac.uk/ws/files/166312154/Epistemic_Decision_Theory_POSTPRINT.pdf
Autor:
Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Konek, J 2016, ' Probabilistic Knowledge and Cognitive Ability ', Philosophical Review, vol. 125, no. 4, pp. 509-587 . https://doi.org/10.1215/00318108-3624754
Sarah Moss (2013) argues that degrees of belief, or credences, can amount to knowledge in much the way that full beliefs can. This essay explores a new kind of objective Bayesianism designed to take us some way toward securing such knowledge-constitu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::7fd2943d9588b60b5c5a9e4614c2eef2
https://hdl.handle.net/1983/59894c39-fc91-4986-b0e0-ccbc8f3ec155
https://hdl.handle.net/1983/59894c39-fc91-4986-b0e0-ccbc8f3ec155
Autor:
Jason Konek
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research.