Zobrazeno 1 - 10
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pro vyhledávání: '"Janet Levin"'
Autor:
Janet Levin
The Metaphysics of Mind presents and discusses the major contemporary theories of the nature of mind, including Dualism, Physicalism, Role-Functionalism, Russellian Monism, Panpsychism, and Eliminativism. Its primary goal is to examine the strengths
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::08b054543e971286466adf8fde69eda7
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108946803
https://doi.org/10.1017/9781108946803
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 98:230-238
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4a0cc0ac0326787779f42324250c9891
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12568
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12568
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
Common Sense Metaphysics
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a9613032743447d0f4e7ec3105f96125
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429319976-6
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780429319976-6
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
Australasian Journal of Philosophy. 97:57-71
Type B, or a posteriori, physicalism is the view that phenomenal-physical identity statements can be necessarily true, even though they cannot be known a priori—and that the key to understanding their status is to understand the special features of
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::cb12c13dcfe7bc7f16831e2fdb541eb5
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1447587
https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2018.1447587
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
Inquiry. 61:590-610
A recent study published in Nature Neuroscience purports to have answered a question posed to Locke in 1688 by his friend William Molyneux, namely, whether ‘a man born blind and made to see’ would be able to identify, immediately and by vision al
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::df4af086405810ea6662787c2fcdbefc
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2017.1372306
https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174x.2017.1372306
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
Philosophy and Phenomenological Research. 95:478-484
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::e775fd00577b9c4a5d0c2b16fa462345
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12413
https://doi.org/10.1111/phpr.12413
Autor:
Janet Levin
Brian Loar, in “Phenomenal States”, presents a compelling account of how bodily sensations and perceptual experiences could be identical with physical properties, while explaining why dualism may nonetheless exert an intuitive pull. However, whil
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::760c61a27b5222a8c2b4166b346cccd2
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351017435-14
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781351017435-14
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
The Senses and the History of Philosophy ISBN: 9781315184418
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::97a9415df2e98f6fbc12d140a8dc004c
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315184418-15
https://doi.org/10.4324/9781315184418-15
Autor:
Janet Levin
Publikováno v:
Blockheads! ISBN: 9780262348973
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::636e6e2bcc51b463ded06c5a309f5383
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0016
https://doi.org/10.7551/mitpress/9196.003.0016
Autor:
Janet Levin
The terms ‘quale’ and ‘qualia’ (plural) are most commonly understood to mean the qualitative, phenomenal or ‘felt’ properties of our mental states, such as the throbbing pain of my current headache, or the peculiar blue of the afterimage
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5fdfd1a50f42ba888c2705a6d14c6255
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-v029-1
https://doi.org/10.4324/9780415249126-v029-1