Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 2 692
pro vyhledávání: '"Janeczko A"'
We show how hidden interesting subelections can be discovered in ordinal elections. An interesting subelection consists of a reasonably large set of voters and a reasonably large set of candidates such that the former have a consistent opinion about
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.18767
Autor:
Faliszewski, Piotr, Janeczko, Łukasz, Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej, Lisowski, Grzegorz, Skowron, Piotr, Szufa, Stanisław
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the proposers want to set as high project prices as possible, provided that
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2407.18092
We study committee elections from a perspective of finding the most conflicting candidates, that is, candidates that imply the largest amount of conflict, as per voter preferences. By proposing basic axioms to capture this objective, we show that non
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2405.05870
Autor:
Boehmer, Niclas, Faliszewski, Piotr, Janeczko, Łukasz, Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej, Lisowski, Grzegorz, Pierczyński, Grzegorz, Rey, Simon, Stolicki, Dariusz, Szufa, Stanisław, Wąs, Tomasz
We analyze how numerical experiments regarding elections were conducted within the computational social choice literature (focusing on papers published in the IJCAI, AAAI, and AAMAS conferences). We analyze the sizes of the studied elections and the
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2402.11765
Autor:
Boehmer, Niclas, Faliszewski, Piotr, Janeczko, Łukasz, Peters, Dominik, Pierczyński, Grzegorz, Schierreich, Šimon, Skowron, Piotr, Szufa, Stanisław
We study ways of evaluating the performance of losing projects in participatory budgeting (PB) elections by seeking actions that would have led to their victory. We focus on lowering the projects' costs, obtaining additional approvals for them, and a
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2312.14723
We study the robustness of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB) rules to random noise in the votes. Our contributions are twofold. First, we study the computational complexity of the #Flip-Bribery problem, where given a PB instance we ask for
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.08125
Autor:
Janeczko, Łukasz, Faliszewski, Piotr
We study the complexity of deciding whether there is a tie in a given approval-based multiwinner election, as well as the complexity of counting tied winning committees. We consider a family of Thiele rules, their greedy variants, Phragmen's sequenti
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2305.01769
Autor:
Boehmer, Niclas, Cai, Jin-Yi, Faliszewski, Piotr, Fan, Austen Z., Janeczko, Łukasz, Kaczmarczyk, Andrzej, Wąs, Tomasz
We study the properties of elections that have a given position matrix (in such elections each candidate is ranked on each position by a number of voters specified in the matrix). We show that counting elections that generate a given position matrix
Externí odkaz:
http://arxiv.org/abs/2303.02538
Autor:
Agnieszka Krawczyk-Łebek, Barbara Żarowska, Monika Dymarska, Tomasz Janeczko, Edyta Kostrzewa-Susłow
Publikováno v:
Scientific Reports, Vol 14, Iss 1, Pp 1-22 (2024)
Abstract Chalcones are intermediate products in the biosynthesis of flavonoids, which possess a wide range of biological properties, including antimicrobial and anticancer activities. The introduction of a chlorine atom and the glucosyl moiety into t
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/e59f06021d5e4a2aafa48cc189e318f1
