Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 20
pro vyhledávání: '"Jan Yngve Sand"'
Publikováno v:
Problems and Perspectives in Management, Vol 9, Iss 3 (2011)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/73cf002996524f5eb2e35a939c3a85b2
Autor:
Derek J. Clark, Jan Yngve Sand
Publikováno v:
Economics: Journal Articles (2010)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/efbd108135c54260a9e8b085068fb4f0
Autor:
Derek J. Clark, Jan Yngve Sand
Publikováno v:
Economics: Journal Articles (2009)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/c95b7e550636400baa0916e47f4d52b1
We consider a principal who faces many identical competitors, and who can distribute a prize fund over two consecutive contests. The winner of contest one gains an advantage in contest two where his effort is more productive than all rivals. We ident
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d13a892d1b1721c348b7d150eb887acb
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/19024
https://hdl.handle.net/10037/19024
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a principal who faces many identical competitors, and who can distribute a prize fund over two consecutive contests. The winner of contest one gains an advantage in contest two where his effort is more productive than all rivals. We ident
Autor:
Jan Yngve Sand
Publikováno v:
Transport Policy. 24:310-319
Infrastructure quality is crucial to achieve an efficient transportation network. This paper considers the regulation of infrastructure quality when the impact of investments on demand is private information. The choice of vertical structure has an i
Publikováno v:
Telecommunications Policy. 33:486-494
In this paper the incentives for platform sponsors to open up their networks for independent rivals is analyzed. It is shown that open access may increase the platform sponsors' profit levels and enhance quality improving investments. In addition, it
Autor:
Jan Yngve Sand
Publikováno v:
Managerial and Decision Economics. 30:57-70
The objective of this paper is to show how efficiency can be implemented in a market with strictly complementary inputs when the productive firms undertake unobservable effort. The observable output is a joint undertaking by a partnership consisting
Publikováno v:
Information Economics and Policy. 17:149-164
We analyze the interconnection incentives for two networks that differ with respect to the size of their installed bases. In the first part, we prove that the smaller firm may be harmed in competition for new customers if the installed base customers
Autor:
Jan Yngve Sand
Publikováno v:
International Journal of Industrial Organization. 22:1289-1307
This paper considers the optimal regulation of access charges, and the effect such regulation has on incentives for non-price discrimination. I show that when a vertically integrated firm is able to discriminate against rivals by means of non-price m