Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 15
pro vyhledávání: '"Jan Christoph Schlegel"'
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 124:62-81
Motivated by the application of designing fair and efficient school choice lotteries, we consider constrained efficiency notions for random assignments under priorities. We provide a constrained (priority respecting) version of the ordinal efficiency
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5ab4782c5f1cda8e34d205c63db5ee6c
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2020.08.009
We study axiomatic foundations for different classes of constant-function automated market makers (CFMMs). We focus particularly on separability and on different invariance properties under scaling. Our main results are an axiomatic characterization
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::53ce74a184e0b10f04c35d1af064692f
Autor:
Jan Christoph Schlegel, Julien Combe
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We consider a reallocation problem with priorities where each agent is initially endowed with a house and is willing to exchange it but each house has a priority ordering over the agents of the market. In this setting, it is well known that there is
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::5918d8bcd17904fb3b755c5f13f73c2c
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859247
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3859247
We study the house allocation with existing tenants model ( Abdulkadiroglu and Sonmez, 1999 ) and consider rules that allocate houses based on priorities. We introduce a new acyclicity requirement and show that for house allocation with existing tena
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::c1fd413dfdcb8685dac063a3e5601d61
Publikováno v:
IEEE ICBC
We study optimal smart contract design for monitoring an exchange of an item performed offline. There are two parties, a seller and a buyer. Exchange happens off-chain, but the status update takes place on-chain. The exchange can be verified but with
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::cd8977c47379d2ba2dae7bfd1511816b
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3404171
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3404171
Autor:
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a55669be4a0ce629ad50dfe31302efbb
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423620
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3423620
Autor:
Jan Christoph Schlegel
We study ex-ante priority respecting (ex-ante stable) lotteries in the context of object allocation under thick priorities. We show that ex-ante stability as a fairness condition is very demanding: Only few agent–object pairs have a positive probab
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::9cf4bc2f35db89ad8916a175de7ec787
Autor:
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Publikováno v:
EC
We study bilateral trading networks with imperfectly transferable utility and frictions. Several structural results for the set of competitive equilibria in trading networks are established: The lattice theorem, the rural hospitals theorem, the exist
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d158f56a88ed4c0be9935cf0921ea439
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230767
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3230767
Autor:
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We show that several classical results (the existence of a worker-optimal stable allocation, the rural hospitals theorem, the group-strategy-proofness of the worker-optimal stable mechanism) extend from the discrete to the continuous case in a genera
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7f2cda0686e50fc5008667ce0c23f819
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157803
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3157803
Autor:
Jan Christoph Schlegel
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory
It is shown that a matching market with contracts can be embedded into a matching market with salaries under weaker conditions than substitutability of contracts. In particular, the result applies to the recently studied problem of cadet-to-branch ma
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::62a2479176c313a744c5ea1b950b2db9
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2015.07.015