Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 81
pro vyhledávání: '"James Sterba"'
Autor:
Swinburne, Richard, author
Publikováno v:
Could a Good God Permit So Much Suffering? : A Debate, 2024.
Externí odkaz:
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192848543.003.0003
Autor:
Swinburne, Richard, author
Publikováno v:
Could a Good God Permit So Much Suffering? : A Debate, 2024.
Externí odkaz:
https://doi.org/10.1093/oso/9780192848543.003.0005
Autor:
Asha Lancaster-Thomas
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 14, Iss 3, p 296 (2023)
James Sterba has recently constructed a new and compelling logical problem of evil that rejects Plantinga’s free-will defense and employs the concept of significant freedom and the Pauline Principle to demonstrate an incompatibility between the exi
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/9a89ad5751b24ff89ffb120da3dd4b0f
Autor:
Carlo Alvaro
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 14, Iss 2, p 200 (2023)
Logical and evidential arguments from evil are generally thought to have been rebutted by various refutations, defenses, and theodicies. While disparate, these responses employ similar strategies to show that God has morally sufficient reasons to per
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4f019fb1f8de4cd6ab2a63822f161a88
Autor:
Luis R. G. Oliveira
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 13, Iss 11, p 1126 (2022)
James Sterba has recently argued that the free will defense fails to explain the compossibility of a perfect God and the amount and degree of moral evil that we see. I think he is mistaken about this. I thus find myself in the awkward and unexpected
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/59bd3d6be1e04d1aa32f79a15b928332
Autor:
Michael S. Jones
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 13, Iss 11, p 1073 (2022)
In 2019 the noted ethicist and political philosopher James Sterba published a new deductive version of the argument from the problem of evil to the conclusion that an Anselmian God does not exist. In this article I will argue that Sterba’s argument
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cbdcd82d07834fb789c7f3495fbe036f
Autor:
Joe Milburn
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 13, Iss 11, p 1083 (2022)
In this paper, I reformulate Sterba’s argument from evil and consider the various ways theists might respond to it. There are two basic families of responses. On the one hand, theists can deny that God, as a perfect being, needs to act in accordanc
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/cd1b9bcff1844e02aa91d614f45796b1
Autor:
Andrea Aguti
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 13, Iss 11, p 1007 (2022)
The article argues that the logical argument from evil is dead, and the new version presented by James Sterba cannot resurrect it. In the first part, I say that the logical argument from evil is dead either because, in the version given by Mackie, it
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/2d0de7ce42d24bdeac3b363716a851b1
Autor:
Patrik Hrmo
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 13, Iss 10, p 931 (2022)
This paper provides an analysis of James Sterba’s argument from evil in the world and the author’s Thomistic counterargument. Many authors of contemporary analytic philosophy of religion discuss the concept of “horrendous evils”, which is a r
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/3e7ea770eb3943a2a8ee5e2e51145a42
Autor:
Bruce R. Reichenbach
Publikováno v:
Religions, Vol 13, Iss 10, p 899 (2022)
James Sterba has constructed a powerful argument for there being a conflict between the presence of evil in the world and the existence of God. I contend that Sterba’s argument depends on a crucial assumption, namely, that God has an obligation to
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/d819262a1578418094c9fc499a38e2c4