Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 30
pro vyhledávání: '"James Schummer"'
Autor:
James Schummer, Rodrigo A. Velez
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 13:116-147
Strategy-proof allocation rules incentivize truthfulness in simultaneous move games, but real world mechanisms sometimes elicit preferences sequentially. Surprisingly, even when the underlying rule is strategy-proof and nonbossy, sequential elicitati
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::1d480936d548bd1545658be809541e42
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180065
https://doi.org/10.1257/mic.20180065
Autor:
James Schummer, Philip Marx
Publikováno v:
Theoretical Economics. 16:799-824
We consider the pricing problem of a platform that matches heterogeneous agents using match‐contingent fees. Absent prices, agents on the short side of such markets capture relatively greater surplus than those on the long side (Ashlagi et al. 2017
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::b683b336764a976309519d6f287eec80
https://doi.org/10.3982/te3665
https://doi.org/10.3982/te3665
Autor:
James Schummer
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 195:105263
Stochastically arriving objects (e.g. transplant organs, public housing units) often are allocated via waiting lists exhibiting deferral rights: agents may decline offers, keeping their position in line. We consider the welfare implications of bestow
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4261e50fb85d3eb375b54d3c9838a501
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105263
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2021.105263
Autor:
Azar Abizada, James Schummer
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory. 170:29-55
During weather-induced airport congestion, landing slots are reassigned based on flights' feasible arrival times and cancelations. We consider the airlines' incentives to report such information and to execute cancelations, creating positive spillove
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7cdd7a1d2d35d24b93c886abfff6d4c0
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2017.04.003
Autor:
James Schummer, Shigehiro Serizawa
Publikováno v:
The Future of Economic Design ISBN: 9783030180492
The search for desirable allocation methods has long been formalized using an axiomatic approach. We contrast how this approach should be applied within the context of general, abstract analyses versus the analysis of specific market design problems.
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::0bf63897f8fef6ec4acad5c59f7a2f64
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_28
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-030-18050-8_28
Autor:
James Schummer, Rakesh Vohra
Publikováno v:
American Economic Journal: Microeconomics. 5:164-85
Industry participants agree that, when inclement weather forces the FAA to reassign airport landing slots, incentives and property rights should be respected. We show that the FAA's Compression algorithm is incentive compatible, but fails to guarante
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3c658bc7e73dd899c7a8d9692df5bbed
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.2.164
http://www.aeaweb.org/articles.php?doi=10.1257/mic.5.2.164
Publikováno v:
Operations Research. 59:400-413
Consider selling bundles of indivisible goods to buyers with concave utilities that are additively separable in money and goods. We propose an ascending auction for the case when the seller is constrained to sell bundles whose elements form a basis o
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::5224f27897835335fda9cff8ae281d56
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0888
https://doi.org/10.1287/opre.1100.0888
Publikováno v:
Journal of Economic Theory, 132(1), 95-118. ACADEMIC PRESS INC ELSEVIER SCIENCE
We construct an ascending auction for heterogeneous objects by applying a primal-dual algorithm to a linear program that represents the efficient-allocation problem for this setting. The auction assigns personalized prices to bundles, and asks bidder
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::d755056e5e87a8c9791864b89b63637a
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jet.2005.07.010
Autor:
James Schummer
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 48:154-170
We relax strategy-proofness (a form of dominant strategy implementation) by allowing “small” gains from manipulation. In 2-agent exchange economies, this relaxation is shown to have a discontinuous effect on the range of efficient rules, demonstr
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::811ed1f801c5d5a5cb5a7d809eb60941
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.08.002
Autor:
James Schummer, Péter Eső
Publikováno v:
Games and Economic Behavior. 47:299-324
We examine whether a two-bidder, second-price auction for a single good (with private, independent values) is immune to a simple form of collusion, where one bidder may bribe the other to commit to stay away from the auction (i.e. submit a bid of zer
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::66698f2b76d61ba552fac3a3f1324cb3
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.geb.2003.06.005