Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 31
pro vyhledávání: '"James D. Laing"'
Publikováno v:
Ciência da Informação, Vol 6, Iss 2 (1977)
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/4618ed87bd924f629f0af051a13d5ae7
Publikováno v:
Journal of Management Information Systems. 12:97-125
The creation of mathematical, as well as qualitative (or rule-based), models is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Recent developments in evolutionary computation hold out the prospect that, for many problems of practical import, machine learn
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fc5a3f4a95df558691b72032e729842d
https://doi.org/10.1080/07421222.1995.11518093
https://doi.org/10.1080/07421222.1995.11518093
Autor:
James D. Laing, Benjamin Slotznick
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 84:49-61
This essay identifies consequences for the core solution in a class of social decision problems concerning the provision of collective goods (or bads) if the rules are modified to permit sidepayments. In these problems, a kind of formal decision proc
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::a8bdc844dcf9bcfd17ebccfbb4fcd3e2
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01047800
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01047800
Autor:
James D. Laing, Benjamin Slotznick
Publikováno v:
Behavioral Science. 36:179-195
This article reports some game-theoretic and laboratory studies of decision making by committees governed by the rule of unanimity. The results have implications for decision making by unanimous consent in living systems at the levels of the individu
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::deb65a45fd41bb13fb65ba34a1b94dd1
https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830360303
https://doi.org/10.1002/bs.3830360303
Autor:
James D. Laing, Benjamin Slotznick
Publikováno v:
Public Choice. 66:229-242
This essay extends the theory of simple collective decision problems to spatial games in which (contrary to the traditional assumption) each agent's preferences are concave, in the sense that the alternatives that the agent does not prefer to any par
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::db013e4cb8ab134fe9efbeb97e8a0138
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125775
https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00125775
Publikováno v:
HICSS (3)
The creation of mathematical, as well as qualitative (or rule-based), models is difficult, time-consuming, and expensive. Recent developments in evolutionary computation hold out the prospect that, for many problems of practical import, machine learn
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::7480d44c6bf019f9900f393a55760dcc
https://doi.org/10.1109/hicss.1995.375625
https://doi.org/10.1109/hicss.1995.375625
Autor:
Wulf Albers, James D. Laing
Publikováno v:
Game Equilibrium Models III ISBN: 9783642081101
Collective decision making by people who, as humans, are merely quasirational is subject to influences of substantively irrelevant features of the decision environment. This paper analyzes data from a computer-aided laboratory study of decision makin
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::89828b220ce0f5c59825459855d69e3c
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_9
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_9
Autor:
James D. Laing
Publikováno v:
Game Equilibrium Models III ISBN: 9783642081101
The bargaining problem facing players who must reach a collective decision can be modeled precisely as a noncooperative game. This essay uses a noncooperative game-th oretic approach to analyze bargaining in a class of games without sidepayments in w
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::40e25091cb8f5205fac5a1976e757104
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_7
https://doi.org/10.1007/978-3-662-07367-4_7
Autor:
James D. Laing, Robin Forman
Publikováno v:
Mathematical Social Sciences. 2:397-420
A fundamental maxim for any theory of social behavior is that knowledge of the theory should not cause behavior that contradicts the theory's assertions. Although this maxim consistently has been heeded in the theory of noncooperative games, it large
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::f535acdf6a1e70cf1152e116bdd49708
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90032-4
https://doi.org/10.1016/0165-4896(82)90032-4