Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 31
pro vyhledávání: '"Jaime F. Zender"'
Publikováno v:
Management Science. 68:4090-4111
We examine the impact of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, on the capital structure decision, using a static tradeoff theory model in which agents are both ambiguity and risk averse. The model confirms the well-known result that greater risk—the
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 57:2444-2483
The role of underwriters is altered in new seasoned equity offering deal types in which the offering follows quickly after its announcement. Controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters, we find increased underwriter
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Autor:
Jaime F. Zender, Michael L. Lemmon
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 54:31-59
Capital structure choice based on costs associated with asymmetric information is examined in order to present a new perspective on the standard pecking order and trade-off theories. In the model, both the face value of debt and the restrictiveness o
The role of underwriters is altered in new seasoned equity offering deal types in which the offering follows quickly after its announcement. Controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters, we find increased underwriter
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::4542d15264e01e7d66c8744ac6d09b67
https://doi.org/10.3386/w26344
https://doi.org/10.3386/w26344
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
The role of underwriters is altered in new seasoned equity offering deal types in which the offering follows quickly after its announcement. Controlling for the endogenous matching between issuing firms and underwriters, we find increased underwriter
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
We examine the importance of ambiguity, or Knightian uncertainty, in the capital structure decision. We develop a static trade off theory model in which agents are both risk averse and ambiguity averse. The model confirms the usual idea that increase
Autor:
Jaime F. Zender, Yehuda Izhakian
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
A Principal-Agent model is examined in which the principal and the agent are ambiguity averse. With a risk neutral principal and a risk averse agent the presence of ambiguity aversion implies that the principal will not always fully insure the agent
Publikováno v:
Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis. 48:1271-1300
An experimental approach is used to compare bidding behavior and auction performance in uniform-price and discriminatory auctions when there is incomplete information concerning the common value of the auctioned good. In a symmetric information envir
Publikováno v:
The Journal of Finance. 63:1575-1608
We find that the majority of variation in leverage ratios is driven by an unobserved time-invariant effect that generates surprisingly stable capital structures: High (low) levered firms tend to remain as such for over two decades. This feature of le