Zobrazeno 1 - 10
of 21
pro vyhledávání: '"J Philipp Reiss"'
Autor:
Erik O Kimbrough, J Philipp Reiss
Publikováno v:
PLoS ONE, Vol 7, Iss 8, p e41812 (2012)
Spiteful, antisocial behavior may undermine the moral and institutional fabric of society, producing disorder, fear, and mistrust. Previous research demonstrates the willingness of individuals to harm others, but little is understood about how far pe
Externí odkaz:
https://doaj.org/article/20b1d83bd6904fc2981c6fb8cd9ab28e
Akademický článek
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Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
This paper experimentally investigates excessive risk taking in contest schemes by implementing a stopping task based on Seel and Strack (2013). In this stylized setting, managers with contest payoffs have an incentive to delay halting projects with
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::dbac88cfedd7069c0483dcf68ecd08d3
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3668143
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3668143
Publikováno v:
European Economic Review. 129:103543
Auction winners sometimes suffer a “bidder’s curse”, paying more for an item at auction than the fixed price charged for an identical item by other sellers. This seemingly irrational behavior is puzzling because the information necessary to avo
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fd611a8611e874cdd4c3a6d37c6fae28
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103543
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2020.103543
Publikováno v:
SSRN Electronic Journal.
Recent research suggests that auction winners sometimes fall prey to a "bidder's curse", paying more for an item at auction than they would have paid at a posted price. One explanation for this phenomenon is that bidders are inattentive to posted pri
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::de5d427009b24ae967f2d2c3fb688620
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2915309
https://doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.2915309
Autor:
Christian Korth, J. Philipp Reiß
Publikováno v:
Group Decision and Negotiation. 23:921-936
We introduce vacuous information into buyer-seller ultimatum exchanges and provide evidence that it can affect bargaining outcomes. Notably bargaining behavior is affected asymmetrically in a way that leads allocative efficiency to respond negatively
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::9f6d396bb48017e62f969dc134dd0b92
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-013-9361-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s10726-013-9361-7
Autor:
J. Philipp Reiß, Oliver Kirchkamp
Publikováno v:
The Economic Journal, 121(557), 1361-1397. Oxford University Press
Deviations from risk-neutral equilibrium bids in auctions can be related to inconsistent expectations with correct best replies or correct expectations but deviant best replies (e.g. because of risk aversion, regret, quantal-response mistakes). To di
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::6cb34d3592b333a1caf07a6fbe342724
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02455.x
https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1468-0297.2011.02455.x
Publikováno v:
European Economic Review, 53(2), 153-169. Elsevier Science
In this paper we derive equilibrium bidding functions for first-price and second-price auctions with private values when bidders have outside options. We then study bidding behaviour with the help of experiments. We find that bidders respond to outsi
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::bab7ff407f93d47648e0730eac3e9329
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.euroecorev.2008.03.005
Autor:
J. Philipp Reiß, Jens Robert Schöndube
Publikováno v:
Economic Theory, 43(1), 99-141. Springer Verlag
We analyze first-price equilibrium bidding behavior of capacity-constrained firms in a sequence of two procurement auctions. In the model, firms with a cost advantage in completing the project auctioned off at the end of the sequence may enter the un
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_dedup___::3c7ef27c083d651cb7b6a83dd1515419
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0428-7
https://doi.org/10.1007/s00199-008-0428-7
Autor:
Lutz Weinert, J. Philipp Reiß
Publikováno v:
Journal of Macroeconomics. 27:69-86
We analyze an endogenous growth model with agents differing in their endowments. Poor entrepreneurs with limited liability need to borrow in financial markets to participate in aggregate output production. We show that the first-best solution can eit
Externí odkaz:
https://explore.openaire.eu/search/publication?articleId=doi_________::fdd09395f939faad3deb3daab7145da5
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2003.10.001
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jmacro.2003.10.001